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INTRODUCTION
Many consumers would like to purchase products that will
influence manufacturers to become environmentally responsi-
ble. Manufacturers and advertisers have responded to this con-
sumer pressure by promoting the environmental attributes of
their products and packaging. Indeed, although the initial rush
has perhaps slowed, "green marketing"I has become the domi-
nant advertising phenomenon of the 1990s. 2
Not all green claims are truthful, however, and few provide
a complete picture of the environmental impact associated with
the good or service advertised. The inherent conflict is clear:
consumers will buy environmentally beneficial products to in-
duce greater corporate environmental responsibility, yet manu-
facturers, striving for greater profits, may have an incentive to
inflate, or even lie about, the environmental attributes of their
products. As a result, some fear that consumers will make
purchasing decisions based upon faulty information. This fear
generates a demand for regulation of green marketing.
The perceived need to regulate green claims has predictably
spawned several hearings and other efforts by various govern-
ment entities. In March 1990, a ten-state Task Force of Attor-
neys General (the "Task Force"), the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is-
sued findings and recommendations regarding green marketing
1. For purposes of this Article, the terms "green marketing," "green
claims," and "environmental claims" are used interchangeably to refer to any
advertisement or label that implies that purchase of the product or its packag-
ing will have environmentally desirable consequences. Of course, no product is
completely environmentally "benign." Consequently, the terms "environmen-
tally benign," "environmentally beneficial," and similar terms used in this arti-
cle refer to a comparison with other competitive products or earlier versions of
the same product. See infra notes 224-229 and accompanying text (discussing
general environmental claims).
2. See infra notes 166-227 and accompanying text.
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in what has become known as the Green Report L3 In May 1991,
following additional hearings and commentary, the Task Force
revised its recommendations in the Green Report II. 4 The FTC
separately held hearings in July 1991,5 after which the FTC is-
sued guidelines describing its position concerning potentially de-
ceptive environmental claims ("FTC Guidelines").6 The United
States Senate also held hearings on the environmental labeling
of consumer products.7 The fear of deceptive advertising and
consumer confusion has prompted an almost universal cry from
legislators,8 bureaucrats, 9 and academics 10 for increased regula-
3. CALIFORN ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS
AND PRELIMINARY RECOMIMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVER-
TISING 19-48 (1990) [hereinafter GREEN REPORT I]. -
4. CALIFoRNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT H: RECOii-
MENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING 1-30 (1991) [here-
inafter GREEN REPORT II].
5. Hearings on Environmental Marketing Issues: Hearings Before the
Federal Trade Commission (1991) (available from the Federal Trade
Commission).
6. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§ 260 (1994) [hereinafter FTC Guidelines].
7. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of 1991
Part 2: Hearings on S. 615 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection
of the Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
3-4, 7-19 (1991) (discussing need for governmental standards for environmental
claims in product advertising); Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1990) (same).
8. Three bills have been proposed at the federal level. Senator Frank
Lautenberg introduced the Environmental Marketing Claims Act in 1990, 361
CONG. REC. S16,019-22 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) (proposal by Sen. Lautenberg of
Senate Bill S. 3218, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)), and again in 1991. 137 CONG.
REC. S3034-39 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (proposal by Sen. Lautenberg of Senate
Bill S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)). Representative Gerry Sikorski intro-
duced the companion House bill. 137 CONG. REC. H1669, E898-99 (daily ed.
Mar. 12, 1991) (proposal by Rep. Sikorski of House Bill H.R. 1408, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991)). See infra notes 392-398 and accompanying text (discussing
proposed federal regulation of green claims). States have also been active. See
infra notes 399-414 and accompanying text (discussing state regulation of green
claims).
9. See, e.g., FTC Guidelines, supra note 6 (establishing both general prin-
ciples and specific guidance on industry use of environmental claims); GREEN
REPORT I, supra note 3 (setting forth recommendations for responsible environ-
mental marketing and urging federal government to adopt regulatory scheme
for environmental marketing claims).
10. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, The Regulation of Green Advertising: The
State, The Market and the Environmental Good, 25 U.B.C. L. REV. 225 (1991)
(arguing that environmental marketing should be governmentally regulated,
although regulation of environmental benefits should be provided by the mar-
ket); Stephen Gardner, How Green Were My Values: Regulation of Environmen-
tal Marketing Claims, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 31, 60 (1991) (stating that "it is
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:245
tion of green claims. Some commentators have even advocated
important that the FTC act with all due speed" in adoption of federal guidelines
for environmental advertising claims); Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The
Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147 (1993) (ar-
guing that Congress should enact legislation both authorizing the EPA to estab-
lish environmental advertising standards and tests, and organizing a structure
for environmental certification); Frank Lautenberg, Environmental Marketing
Claims Act: Pulling the "Green" over our Eyes, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 305
(1992) (arguing that Environmental Marketing Claims Act, which would re-
quire the EPA to establish regulations for environmental marketing claims,
should be enacted); Thomas C. Downs, Comment, "Environmentally Friendly"
Product Advertising: Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM.
U. L. Ray. 155, 160-61 (1992) ("[LWegislation linking green claims regulation to
comprehensive environmental policy is the best means of eliminating unlawful
green claims, encouraging truthful green marketing by industry, and advancing
the overall cause of environmental protection."); Ciannat M. Howett, Note, The
"Green Labeling" Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the Regulation of Envi-
ronmental Product Claims, 11 VA. ENvmL. L.J. 401 (1992) (discussing various
constituencies as balanced in an effective regulatory scheme); Glenn Israel,
Comment, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENvmTL. AFF. L. REv. 303 (1993) (support-
ing passage of Environmental Marketing Claims section of the National Waste
Reduction, Recycling, and Management Act to regulate environmental claims);
Paul Luehr, Comment, Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal
Trade Commission in Regulating Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & PoL'y 311, 336 (1992) ("FTC must. .. act swiftly to adopt industry
guidelines .... ."); June C. B. Raines, Comment, Environmental Law: The Green
Giant: Environmental Marketing Claims, 45 OiA. L. REv. 689 (1992) (calling
for uniform standards or guidelines to provide consumers with correct informa-
tion in choosing environmentally oriented products); Todd A. Rathe, Note, The
Gray Area of the Green Market: Is it Really Environmentally Friendly? Solu-
tions to Confusion Caused by Environmental Advertising, 17 J. CORP. L. 419
(1992) (arguing that solution to environmental advertising confusion must in-
volve combination of uniform guidelines and national green seal); Joanna L.
Watman, Note, Whose Grass is Greener? Green Marketing: Toward a Uniform
Approach for Responsible Environmental Advertising, 3 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L.
REP. 163, 164 (1992) (concluding that "national advertising standards are es-
sential to maximize green marketing benefits"); David F. Welsh, Comment, En-
vironmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the
"Gray" Behind the "Green", 81 CAL. L. Rv. 991, 994 (1993) ("[U]niform nation-
wide regulation of green marketing is necessary."); Roger D. Wynne, Note, De-
fining "Green": Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 785, 788 (1991) ("This Note joins a rising chorus calling for
government regulation of green marketing claims.").
Several commentators do not call for increased regulation. See J. HowARD
BEALES & TIMoTHY J. MuRis, STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF NATIONAL
ADvERTISING 83-112 (1993) (arguing that the FTC should allow environmental
claims where manufacturer may reasonably conclude product offers that fea-
ture); PETER S. MENELL, EcO-INFORMATION POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INsTITU-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 90-103 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 104, 1993) (explaining weakness and
limitations of environmental labeling schemes and advocating implementation
of environmental policy through the price system); James T. O'Reilly, Environ-
mental Product Certification: The Legal Implications of Green Endorsements, 8
248
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regulations to influence consumers' decisions to comply with the
state's environmental policy goals regardless of whether those
goals are consistent with consumer preferences.'1
This Article asserts that such a paternalistic approach is
both unwise and unnecessary. Specifically, increased regulation
deters manufacturers from touting environmental attributes of
their products, which has the effect of limiting the interchange
of information between manufacturers and consumers. Further-
more, current consumer doubt and lack of trust in environmen-
tal advertising does not evidence market failure. Instead,
uncertainty reflects a well-functioning market for information
about environmental attributes. The market, operating without
significant regulatory impediments, efficaciously closes informa-
tional gaps and best promotes environmental goals.
Part I of this Article briefly describes environmental attrib-
utes of products and the growing "green market." Part II then
analyzes the appropriate policy goals aimed at regulating the
green market. In particular, Part II discusses the various meth-
ods of measuring the environmental impact of a given product
and concludes that measurement is difficult and imprecise. Part
II concludes that maximizing the flow of beneficial information
to consumers is the only legitimate regulatory goal of policies
directed at environmental advertising.
Part III analyzes the green market using the economics of
information ("EOI") as a paradigm. According to EOI, consumer
distrust of advertising messages is completely appropriate, and
is highest when the cost of obtaining information to evaluate an
advertising claim is high. This uncertainty evidences an effi-
cient market,12 not market failure.
Although the green market functions efficiently, proposals
for green advertising regulations nonetheless continue to sur-
face. Part IV discusses these proposals as well as existing regu-
latory mechanisms, focusing on three prominent models of
J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 199, 211 (1993) (discussing potential antitrust challenges
to nongovernmental green certification schemes that endorse certain products).
11. See infra notes 106-117 and accompanying text (discussing proposals
that would manipulate the market to accomplish undefined environmental
policies).
12. The prevailing measure of "efficiency" is "Pareto optimality," a situa-
tion said to exist when it is impossible to effect a change benefitting one individ-
ual without harming someone else. For a discussion of Pareto efficiency and
other competing economic welfare measures, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Exchange and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law,
68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980).
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regulation: anti-deceptive regulations, definitional regulations,
and eco-logo regulations.
Part V critically examines the various regulatory alterna-
tives and concludes that the regulation of deception is the only
appropriate regulatory goal. Additional environmental advertis-
ing regulation is undesirable because definitional standards and
eco-logo programs require that regulators make environmental
policy decisions prior to enacting the advertising regulation.
The advertising message is thus manipulated to accomplish the
regulator's environmental agenda. Such an approach is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the appropriate goals of advertising
policy and with the free market approach to environmental
regulation.
I. THE MARKET FOR GREEN: CONSUMER
PREFERENCES FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY
SAFE PRODUCTS 13
Earth Day 1990 represented an environmental awakening
for the mainstream public.14 Thereafter, ecology became a con-
13. There are several excellent summaries of survey evidence related to
green marketing. This section relies heavily on MANoJ HASTAK ET AL.,
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER SURVEYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN
ADVERTISING AND LABELING (1993) (prepared under contract with the FTC);
OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AmD EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, ASSESSING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET (1991) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE
EVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET]; and OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION
AND TOxICS, U.S. EPA, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS IN
THE UNITED STATES 7-70 (1993) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING TERMS].
14. "Earth Day" is an annual event that began in 1970. See Samuel P.
Hays, From Conservation to Environment: Environmental Politics in the U.S.
Since World War II, ENVTL. REV., Fall 1982, at 14, 24; David Broder, Beyond
Folk Songs and Flowers, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1990, at B7. In the early 1990s,
public concern about the environment grew faster than concern about any other
issue. EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at 7
(citing THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE 1990s:
WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS (1991)). Concerns about the recession and the Gulf
War, however, interrupted this trend in 1991. Id. at 7 n.6 (citing LEO BUmR=
WORLDWIDE, INC., INTEREST IN ENVIRONMENT DROPS DRAMATICALLY (press re-
lease, May 26, 1992)). More recent surveys show continued growth in public
concern over environmental issues. Dennis Chase & Theresa Kauchak Smith,
Consumers Keen on Green But Marketers Fail to Deliver, ADVERTISING AGE,
June 29, 1992, at S-2. Although actual membership in green groups peaked
towards the end of the Reagan Administration, contributions to environmental
groups increased more than any other sort of charitable giving between 1991
and 1992. As Green Turns to Brown: Environmental Groups, ECONOMIST, Mar.
5, 1994, at A27, A27.
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cern no longer reserved only for a few activists. 15 According to a
post-Earth Day Gallup Report, seventy-six percent of American
consumers consider themselves "environmentalists."16 Ameri-
15. See Casey Bukro, Shopping for an Ideal, CH. TRm., Nov. 17, 1991, at
24, 25; Robert Cahn & Patricia Cahn, Did Earth Day Change the World?, ENVI-
RONMENT, Sept. 1990, at 17; Elizabeth Hedstrom, Earth Day: The Green Move-
ment Kicks Off the Environmental Decade, NAT'L PAUS, MarJApr. 1990, at 18,
21-23; Connie Koenenn, It's Not Easy Being Green, L.A. Taifs, Apr. 17, 1991, at
El, E4; Priscilla Painton, Greening From the Roots Up, Tiz, Apr. 23, 1990, at
76, 77.
16. Joe Schwartz, Earth Day Today, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 1990, at 40-
41 (summarizing Gallup Report). This same report found that environmental-
ism increases with education level and income and is heavily concentrated in
the 30 to 49 age group. Id.; see also Carl Frankel, Consumers Hungry for Envi-
ronmental News, GREEN MARKETALERT, July 1992, available in Westlaw, PTS-
Promt Database (91% of respondents to Society of Environmental Journalists
survey were "'somewhat or very interested'" in environmental news, compared
to 85% for education and local schools and 61% for sports).
In addition, approximately 20% of the population is "highly concerned"
about the environment. See EVALUATION OF ENvmRomME~NAL MARKETING
TEnsS, supra note 13, at 8, Table 2.1, (summarizing results of various surveys);
HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 34 (pagination added) (reporting Roper Organ-
ization survey, which was commissioned by Citizens for the Environment, Inc.,
showing that 85% of respondents were "very concerned" or "somewhat con-
cerned" about the disposal of solid waste).
Although the use of survey data to predict behavior or gauge attitudes is
potentially troublesome, consistency among surveys lends some credence to the
results. The use of survey data is a theoretically sound method for determining
consumer opinions on various issues, products, and practices. Reliability of sur-
vey responses is conditioned upon a variety of factors, including the experience
of a research organization, its managers, and its interviewers; the history of the
organization's work in the field or with a particular company; sample size and
composition; question format (leading, open-ended, or pre-coded questions);
question content (subject matter of the survey); the location where the survey is
administered; the time at which the survey is administered (pre- or post-litiga-
tion); and the length of the survey. See Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers
Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp 670, 680-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (discussing consumer
survey procedures and noting trend for courts to admit such surveys into evi-
dence); MacMillan, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 208, 273-92 (1980) (interpreting validity of
FTC surveys measuring whether vocational school's advertising representa-
tions were deceptive); Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1424-38 (1975)
(describing test given to consumers to measure perception of advertising
message); ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 865, 900-16 (1973) (ana-
lyzing surveys conducted to test efficacy of nutritional claims in commercials on
consumer perception of product); WILLIAM FODDY, CONSTRUCTING QUESTIONS
FOR INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES 2-8, 112-25 (1993); Suzanne Bonamici,
Note, The Use and Reliability of Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising, 62
OR. L. REV. 561 (1983) (advocating use of survey evidence in challenges to ad-
vertising claims before the FTC); Ronald L. Marmer, Note, Opinion Polls and
the Law of Evidence, 62 VA. L. REV. 1101, 1124-25 (1976) (discussing problems
of adequately sampling the proper group in opinion polls); A. Rogula Herzog &
Jerald G. Backman, Effects of Questionnaire Length on Response Quality, PUB.
OPINION Q., Winter 1981, at 549 (analyzing effect of questionnaire length on
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can consumers now consistently rank environmental protection
as one of our country's most important issues 17 and have ex-
pressed their concern for the environment by desiring to
purchase products they perceive as safer for the environment. 18
reliability and uniformity of results); Benjamin Lipstein, In Defense of Small
Samples, J. ADVERTISING RES., Feb. 1975, at 33, 34 (identifying and explaining
sources of errors and biases in sample surveys); J. Thomas Rosch, Marketing
Research and the Legal Requirements of Advertising, J. MARKETING, July 1975,
at 69, 70 (discussing importance of marketing research in FTC litigation over
whether advertising is deceptive).
17. See, e.g., NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD GARBAGE DISPOSAL (1989), reported in ASSESSING THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET, supra note 13, at app. A-4 (reporting that mu-
nicipal solid waste disposal ranked second to public education as most serious
problem facing local officials); HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 42 (pagination
added) (citing results of survey by Environmental Research Associates, report-
ing that environment rated as important as homelessness, poverty, and educa-
tion); id., at 37 (pagination added) (citing surveys by the Food Marketing
Institute and the Good Housekeeping Institute, reporting that garbage and
solid waste disposal are considered more serious problems than nuclear safety,
food safety, and national defense, and that concern for environmental problems
rated second only to drug problems); Ned Zeman & Lucy Howard, Priorities,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 2, 1990, at 5, 5 (reporting that clean environment ranked sec-
ond only to a happy family life as indispensable); see also Actions Versus Asser-
tions: the Gap Narrows, GREEN MARKETALERT, May 1993, available in
Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database (reporting results of Simmons Market Research
Bureau survey which showed the two greenest consumer segments increased
from 43% of the populace in 1991 to 53% in 1992, while the "unconcerned" seg-
ment decreased from 19% to 14% over the same period); Chase & Smith, supra
note 14, at S-2 (reporting results of 1992 poll showing consumer concern about
the environment growing rather than abating); Green and Getting Greener,
GREEN MARKETALERT, Jan. 1993, available in Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database
(reporting results of 1992 Environmental Research Associates survey showing
that 51% of consumers said they "always" or "usually" look for green labelling,
compared to 32% in 1990).
There is some dispute about what role the "grassroots" environmental
movement has played in policy development. One commentator describes sup-
port for environmental protection as a "permissive consensus" where there is
"widespread but not terribly intense public support." Riley E. Dunlap, Public
Opinion and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 131 (J. Lester ed., 1989). The "government has consid-
erable flexibility in pursuing the goal and is not carefully monitored by the pub-
lic." Id.
18. One survey found that 89% of adults were concerned about the environ-
mental impact of the products they buy. Bruce Horovitz, Firm Exercises Its
Social Consciousness, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1989, at D-1 (citing 1989 Michael Pe-
ters Group poll). A survey performed by the magazine Packaging in 1990 found
that 20% would be willing to pay 6 to 10 cents more for a product packaged in
"easy-to-recycle" material. Melissa Larson, Consumers Grapple with 'Green'
Packaging, PACKAGING, July 1990, at 8, 8-10. See also Steve Cooper, Family
Forum, BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, Mar. 1994, at 20, 20 (noting that 63% of
respondents bought low-phosphate detergents and 56% bought low-flow faucets
and shower heads); Carl Frankel, Deep Green Product Prices: Where They Are,
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Yet, consumers' desire to purchase environmentally safe
products does not always affect actual purchasing decisions.
Although many consumers consider the relative environmental
impacts when purchasing products, 19 fewer will actually pay a
premium for such attributes. 20 A 1991 Wall Street Journal/
NBC News poll found that seventy-five percent of those surveyed
considered important the environmental reputation of a product
Where They're Headed, GREEN MARKETALERT, Nov. 1992, available in Westlaw,
PTS-Promt Database (reporting that Roper Organization/Johnson Wax survey
found that consumers would pay a premium of four to five percent for green
products in eight categories); Felix H. Kent, Green Marketing, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
22, 1991, at 3, 35 (noting that consumers are willing to pay up to five percent
more for environmentally sound products). Other surveys indicate that from
77% to 90% of adults would pay more for a product packaged in recyclable or
biodegradable material. Most Would Pay More For Cleaner Environment,
U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 13, 1990, at 10A. Fifty-seven percent of those that U.S.A.
Today surveyed said they would pay 15% more for groceries packaged with re-
cycled materials. Id.; see also Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, supra note 7, at 46 (statement of Denis
Hayes, quoting a 1989 Ad Age/Gallup Organization poll that found that 90% of
women and 87% of men would be willing to pay more for products or packaging
made environmentally safer); HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 26 (pagination
added) (reporting results of an ABT Associates survey that 90% of respondents
indicated willingness to pay more for environmentally friendly products). A
Wall Street Journal/NBC News survey found that 67% would pay 15 to 20 cents
more per gallon for a less polluting gasoline; 85% would pay more for more fuel-
efficient and less polluting automobiles, even at the expense of safety. Rose
Gutfeld, Shades of Green: Eight of 10 Americans Environmentalists, at Least
They Say So, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1991, at 1. One survey reported that in 1993,
18% of respondents ranked the environment as "an important factor in brand
choice, placing it behind 'past experience with the brand' (82%), 'reasonably
priced' (64%), and 'reputation for quality' (47%) in the first tier, and behind
'well-known/well-advertised' (26%) in the second tier." The Return of Roper's
TrueBlue Greens: Less Is More, GREEN MARxETALERT, Feb. 1994, available in
Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database. This represents a six percent increase for envi-
ronmental considerations since 1989. Id. A survey conducted by Eurobarome-
ter in April 1992 revealed "that 70% of all Europeans were prepared to pay
more for environmentally-friendly products. Twenty-one percent of U.K. citi-
zens polled even went so far as to say they would pay up to 50% extra for 'green'
products." Green Labelling: European Eco-Label About to Be Flushed Away?
EUROPE ENV'T, July 26, 1994, available in Westlaw, PTS-News Database.
19. See HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 42 (pagination added) (citing Envi-
ronmental Research Associates survey, showing that 40% of respondents
avoided purchasing product because product or package was harmful to envi-
ronment); Larson, supra note 18, at 8-10 (reporting that 65% of consumers say
that packaging labeled recyclable "often or sometimes" affected decision to buy
product); Most Would Pay More for Cleaner Environment, supra note 18, at 10A
(stating that 52% of respondents claim they stopped buying products made by
companies they thought were polluting).
20. HASTAK Er AL., supra note 13, at 26 (pagination added) (reporting re-
sults of ABT Associates survey).
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or manufacturer, but only fifty-four percent actually selected a
more expensive product for environmental reasons. 21 Similarly,
fifty-eight percent of adult men in a separate survey said that
aerosols should not be used, yet eighty-seven percent had
purchased aerosols in the previous six months.22
Nevertheless, the number of consumers considering envi-
ronmental impacts in their purchasing decisions remains sub-
stantial. Nearly one in every two consumers has altered his or
her purchasing decisions to help protect the environment.23 As
a result, several commentators see the willingness of consumers
to consider environmental attributes in their purchasing deci-
sions as a way to use market forces to influence manufacturers'
environmental decisions.24 These commentators seemingly pre-
fer manipulating advertising messages to accomplish undefined
(and perhaps undefinable) environmental goals, an inefficient
and inconsistent policy.
II. DEFINING THE GOAL: DOES REGULATION
INCREASE TRUTH?
Lawmakers commonly offer two rationales to justify in-
creased regulation of environmental advertising: i) consumers
are uncertain and confused about the environmental impact of
products, and ii) definitions that are commonly used by environ-
21. Gutfeld, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that 54% of respondents chose a
more expensive alternative because of environmental concerns); HASTAK ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 26 (pagination added) (citing ABT Associates survey, showing
that 51% of consumers considered the environmental attributes of a product
and/or company when selecting a product).
22. New Study Finds Green Confusion: Consumers' Environmental Atti-
tudes Differ From Their Buying Habits, ADvERTISING AGE, Oct. 21, 1991, at 1.
Similarly, 60% of adult women said that aerosols should not be used for toilet-
ries and household cleaners, but 49% had purchased more aerosol hair sprays
than non-aerosol hair sprays over the same time period. Id.
23. Gutfeld, supra note 18, at 1. A survey reported that of the consumers
polled, 45% had read labels for environmentally harmful products, 34% reduced
use of paper towels, 49% bought products made of recycled materials, 54%
stopped using aerosol sprays, and 31% bought products because they were sup-
posed to be good for the environment. Environmental Action, ADvERTiSiNG AGE,
Dec. 10, 1990, at 62. See also Chase & Smith, supra note 14, at S-2 (reporting
that 60% of survey respondents more likely to purchase product because of
green claims today than they were three years ago). An unscientific survey of
10,000 Better Homes and Gardens readers found that 88% reported having seen
green advertising in recent years. Cooper, supra note 18, at 20.
24. See infra notes 230-234 and accompanying text (inferring that con-
sumer confusion dilutes the efficacy of green advertising and subsequently the
development of environmentally positive market forces).
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mental advertisers lack uniformity.25 If regulators were con-
cerned only about consumer confusion, the policy goal would be
clear: educate the consumer.26 Consumer confusion, however,
merely reflects scientific uncertainty concerning the environ-
mental impact of products rather than a break-down in educat-
ing consumers. Therefore, this Article later establishes that
eliminating deceptive advertising on a case-by-case basis is the
only legitimate regulatory policy.27
A. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND ENmoNMENTAL IMPACTS:
How GREEN Is GREEN?
Most of the scientific uncertainty in assessing the environ-
mental impact of a product, package, or manufacturing process
concerns measuring tradeoffs of one environmental benefit for
another. Unfortunately, such tradeoffs are inherent in environ-
mental policy decisions. Emphasizing one environmental attri-
bute will often decrease one type of environmental damage, but
only at the expense of increasing another. For example, efforts
to reduce the use of chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") and other
ozone-depleting chemicals 28 have induced companies to replace
aerosol propellants with propellants contributing to ground-
25. See EVALUATION OF ENVmONMENTAL MARI=iNG TERMS, supra note 13,
at 10 (discussing a variety of terms used in environmental advertising); see also
supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text (discussing fears of consumer confu-
sion from green advertising).
26. Many commentators and lawmakers call for increased education as an
integral part of any green marketing regulation scheme. See, e.g., S. 615, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1991) (proposing environmental education programs for
consumers); Hearings on Environmental Marketing Issues: Hearings Before the
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 107-12 (testimony of George Wash-
ington University student, Brian Perkis, suggesting that consumer education is
necessary component for success of any legislation); Ben Cohen, Foreword to
JOHN ELKINGTON ET AL., THE GREEN CONSUMER at xi-xii (1990) (advocating con-
sumer education as a way to influence companies); MENELL, supra note 10, at 8
(discussing the value of consumer education and the need for government inter-
vention in green marketing); Downs, supra note 10, at 159 (proposing regula-
tion of green marketing to avoid misleading but legal advertising).
27. See infra notes 452-460 and accompanying text (discussing market effi-
ciency that results when government intervention is limited to anti-deception
regulations). See also BEALES & MuRis, supra note 10, at 83-112 (discussing
market benefits of limited regulation of advertising); Howard A. Latin, Environ-
mental Deregulation and Consumer Decision-Making Under Uncertainty, 6
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 187 (1982) (same).
28. CFCs are stable molecules that reach the stratosphere largely intact
and cause degradation of the stratospheric ozone layer by high energy solar
radiation. Class I Ozone Depleting Substances, 56 Fed. Reg. 2420, 2420 (1991).
CFCs had several commercial uses, including refrigeration, solvents, and
foams, before the EPA defined and banned them as Class I Ozone Depleting
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based smog.29 Similarly, switching from polystyrene to paper
food containers reduces solid waste;30 manufacture of polysty-
rene containers, however, uses less energy and produces less at-
mospheric and waterborne emissions than does the production
of paper.3 1 The environmental impact of paper grocery sacks
versus plastic is also uncertain. Under certain assumptions,
plastic sacks use less energy, contribute less to the volume of
solid waste, and produce less water and air pollutants than pa-
per sacks.32
Switching from plastic to paper may cause other problems
as well. McDonald's, responding to economic pressure and ad-
vice from the Environmental Defense Fund, switched its pack-
aging from polystyrene, the symbol of American environmental
excess, to plastic-coated paper.33 In the years before making
this well-publicized switch, however, McDonald's had estab-
lished polystyrene recycling facilities in 600 restaurants and
had planned to implement 8000 more.3 4 By converting from pol-
Substances. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 82 (1994) (codifying the EPA ban on
CFCs).
29. Jaclyn Fierman, The Big Muddle in Green Marketing, FORTUNE, June
3, 1991, at 91, 96.
30. FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES, LTD., RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE
ANALYSIS OF FoAM POLYSTYRENE AND BLEACHED PAPERBOARD CONTAINERS 4-27,
4-28 (1990) (prepared for The Council for Solid Waste Solutions).
31. Id. at 4-4 to 4-27. See TELLUS INsTITUTE, CSGTELLUS PACKAGING
STUDY (1992) (Executive Summary).
32. FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES, LTD., supra note 30, at 1-4 to 1-13; see also infra
text accompanying notes 86-105 (discussing the different environmental impact
conclusions between disposable and cloth diapers that result from altering
assumptions).
33. Scott Hume, McDonald's, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 32. Kids
Against Pollution had sponsored a letter writing campaign to McDonald's, ex-
pressing its concern that polystyrene food packaging was dangerous for the en-
vironment. Janice Castro, One Big Mac, Hold the Box!: McDonald's Faces a
Children's Crusade Against Polystyrene, Tnm, June 25, 1990, at 44. McDon-
ald's reacted by pressuring its polystyrene suppliers to shift to environmentally
benign processes. Hume, supra, at 32. Public pressure, however, continued to
mount, and in mid-1990 the Environmental Defense Fund offered its assistance
to help McDonald's "green-up" its business and its image. Id. As a result of this
alliance, McDonald's switched from polystyrene to plastic coated paper "quilt
wrap" for sandwiches and plastic coated cardboard cups. Id.
34. Richard A. Denison, Forum: McDonald's Container Decision: Good or
Bad?, GNNETr NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 18, 1990; Castro, supra note 33, at 44.
Although the environmental wisdom of its decision to switch to plastic-coated
paper is subject to debate, the public relations aspect has been a success.
Surveys show that consumers now widely view McDonald's as the most envi-
ronmentally responsible company in the country. Carl Frankel, Restaurant
Chains and the Environment, GREEN MARKETALERT, June 1993, available in
Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database.
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ystyrene to paper, McDonald's sent a budding polystyrene re-
cycling industry into a tailspin.35
Similar problems exist regarding other aspects of the solid
waste crisis. Approximately eighty percent of all solid waste
ends up in a landfill.3 6 In twenty years, eighty percent of the
nation's existing landfills could reach capacity and close.3 7 The
establishment of new landfills, however, faces opposition from
local interests because of perceived health and environmental
concerns. 38 As a result, the EPA has initiated many programs
to reduce the amount of solid waste.39
The best method for dealing with the solid waste "crisis" is
not clear. Although strongly promoted by the EPA, recycling is
not necessarily the most environmentally appropriate option.
Some paper recycling mills are chronic polluters and may create
a net environmental detriment.40 In addition, local recycling fa-
cilities do not exist everywhere. Critics argue that manufactur-
ers mislead consumers when they promote products as
recyclable when local facilities do not exist.41 Industry repre-
sentatives contend, however, that labelling products as "recycl-
able" induces the development of a market for recyclable
material.42
Further contributing to the solid waste dilemma is the ad-
vent of degradable plastics. Usually made degradable by the ad-
dition of cornstarch, these plastics offer questionable benefits
because only the cornstarch additives break down; the plastic
itself remains intact.43 In addition, including cornstarch to ac-
complish degradability may make recycling plastics more diffi-
35. John Holusha, A Setback for Polystyrene, N.Y. Ti ms, Nov. 18, 1990, at
14.
36. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. 07A-0-
424, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT NEXT FOR MUNCIPAL SOLID WASTE? 3
(1989) [hereinafter FACING AMERICA'S TRASH].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., U.S. E.P.A., PUB. No. EPA/530/SW-91-005, UNIT PRICING PRO-
VIDING AN INCENTIVE TO REDUCE MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE (1991).
40. Denis Hayes, Feeling Green About Green, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29,
1991, at 46.
41. See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying text (discussing the problem
of unavailable recycling facilities).
42. Hearings on Environmental Marketing Issues: Hearings Before the
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 78-80.
43. See infra notes 200-212 and accompanying text (defining "degradable").
But see Jim Glenn, Degradables Tested in Compost Programs, BIOCYCLE, Oct.
1989, at 28 (arguing that the manner in which biodegradable plastics break
down may actually provide environmental benefits).
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cult.44 Recycling and degrading may thus become mutually
exclusive alternatives. Moreover, degradable plastics may re-
lease substances that contaminate groundwater and create
other health hazards. 45
In spite of these problems, several state legislatures have
endorsed or mandated the use of degradable plastics. 46
Although a lack of adequate information may account for this
legislative endorsement, 47 degradable plastics do provide some
clear benefits. Plastic yokes used to create convenient six-packs
of aluminum cans often have a devastating effect on wildlife, as
animals may get caught in the rings and strangle or consume
them and die from digestive tract failure.48 Degradable yokes
would avoid much of this impact. Moreover, in spite of the tech-
nical and practical difficulties, degradability may hold the great-
est promise for dealing with the solid waste crisis. Many argue
that a market for degradable plastics, therefore, should continue
in order to support research efforts.49
44. RicHARD A. DENISON & JEANNE WIRKA, DEGRADABLE PLASTICS: THE
WRONG ANSWER TO THE RIGHT QUESTION 4-6 (1989).
45. Id. at 4-5; GREEN REPORT I, supra note 3, at 17.
46. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 325E.042 (1992). Many states mandate that plastic
yokes be made from degradable plastic. AiAsKA STAT. § 46.06.090(b) (1991);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.708 (West 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 339-22 (Supp. 1990);'
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13.1E-99.4 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 459A.720(5)
(1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34A-7-5 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1525(a)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1991). In addition, Congress has mandated that
plastic ring carriers be made of "naturally degradable material" so that fish and
wildlife will be protected. 42 U.S.C. § 6914(b) (1988).
47. See, e.g., GREEN REPORT I, supra note 3, at 31 n.21 (describing Minne-
sota's shift of position concerning degradable plastics).
48. Michael Weisskopf, Plastic Reaps a Grim Harvest in the Oceans of the
World, SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 1988, at 58.
49. Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, supra note 7, at 90 (testimony of Ramani Narayan, Senior Sci-
entist, Michigan Biotechnology Institute) ("[Tihere are emerging biodegradable
technologies which can address this waste management issue, and we want to
be careful that we do not eliminate them because of misconceptions and myths
about what they can and cannot do."); Recyclable Materials: Plastics in the En-
vironment: Hearings on H.R. 5000 Before the Subcomm. on National Resources,
Agriculture Research, and Environment of the House Comm. on Science, Space,
and Technology, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (statements from industry repre-
sentatives, environmentalists, and members of Congress on the advantages of
degradable plastics in waste management).
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B. PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT: MEASURING THE
RELATIVE GREEN OF PRODUCTS
Measuring a product's total environmental impact involves
consideration of environmental impacts at various stages of the
product's life. Environmental advertising claims focusing exclu-
sively on waste issues fail to provide an accurate assessment of
the product's true environmental impact. Notably, the latest
wave of green advertising has lacked claims of energy efficiency
or other resource use issues related to the environmental prac-
tices of the manufacturer.5 0 Policy-makers and consumers must
consider such resource issues to assess accurately the environ-
mental impact associated with any product.
To provide a more complete "cradle-to-grave" assessment of
environmental impacts, many experts have focused on a process
known as product life-cycle assessment ("PLCA"). 5 1 PLCA de-
veloped in response to the growing concern over energy use in
the 1970s, but the latest "green wave" has been virtually devoid
of claims related to energy use.5 2 PLCA, however, has recently
experienced a rebirth as a tool to measure the relative green of
various products. 53 Although proponents hail the PLCA as a
panacea, others have reservations about the current usefulness
of PLCA as a tool to measure total environmental impact.54
50. See infra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing infrequency of
energy use and resource conservation claims). This is in sharp contrast to the
mid-1970s, when energy and resource use were at the forefront of consumer
concern. SocmTY OF ENVIRONMNTAL TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, A TEcHIN-
CAL FAMEwoRK FOR LIFE-CYcLE ASSESSMENT 3 (1991) [hereinafter SETACI;
Mary Ann Curran, Broad-Based Environmental Life Cycle Assessment, 27
ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 430, 432 (1993).
51. B.W. VIGON ET AL., LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT: INVENTORY GUIDELINES
AND PRINCIPLES 1-3 (Environmental Protection Agency Pub. No. 600/R-92/245,
1993) [hereinafter INVENTORY GUIDELINES] (describing purposes and goals of
life-cycle assessment).
52. SETAC, supra note 50, at 3-4.
53. Curran, supra note 50, at 432.
54. See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, COMMENTS OF THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DEFENSE FUND ON SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS' LIFECYCLE INVEN-
TORY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT CARD 3 (prepared by Richard A. Denison
1992) ("EDF strongly believes that the use of lifecycle assessment... in the
context of product/package certification cannot be justified on technical or policy
grounds at this time ... ."); Anne Magnuson, What Has Happened to Waste
Reduction?, AMi. CITY & CouNTY, Apr. 1991, at 30 (suggesting that once the
PLCA is improved, it will encourage consumer "smart shopping"); Jerry Taylor,
Don't Restrict "Green" Product Advertising, CONsUMER's RES. MAG., May 1992,
at 23, 25 (arguing against restriction of green claims and life-cycle analyses and
noting that "virtually every [PLCA] ... undertaken recently has obliterated
environmental 'conventional wisdom'"); Penelope Wang, Going for Green,
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The EPA's definition of PLCA involves examining the envi-
ronmental impacts of a specific product by tracking its develop-
ment from a raw material, through its production, and to
eventual disposal.55 The Society of Environmental Toxicology
and Chemistry ("SETAC"), a non-profit professional society rep-
resenting environmental toxicologists, chemists, hazard asses-
sors, and engineers, has been pivotal in developing PLCA.56 In
1990, SETAC hosted a conference to assess the current usage of
PLCA and identify areas for future research. 51 Importantly, the
conference resolved that a complete PLCA should consist of
three components: life-cycle inventory, life-cycle impact analy-
sis, and life-cycle improvement analysis.58
The first stage, inventory analysis, identifies and quantifies
the "energy and resource use and environmental releases to air,
water, and land" of raw materials used in the subject product.59
Unfortunately few PLCAs have advanced beyond the inventory
analysis, because of the difficulty involved with balancing envi-
ronmental impacts at different stages of the process.60 The im-
pact analysis evaluates the toxicity and risk associated with the
waste created by manufacturing the product, as well as the gen-
eral environmental consequences of the inputs and outputs. 61
The life-cycle improvement analysis yields results that are very
complex and seldom provide definitive answers.62
Advocates argue that PLCA represents a fundamental shift
in paradigm from examining discrete environmental impacts to
a more holistic approach.63 Pollution and other environmental
MONEY, Sept. 1991, at 98, 101-02 (suggesting that consumers avoid life-cycle
analyses and instead look for energy-conserving products, and suggesting that
the entire life-cycle concept may not be valid); Which are Best for the Environ-
ment?, 56 CONSUMER REP. 555 (1991) (noting that a life-cycle analysis can point
out environmental drawbacks to both cloth and disposable diapers).
55. 1NvENToRY GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 4-5. For example, the 3M
Company's life-cycle approach looks at how waste can be reduced or eliminated
starting with the point of generation in the manufacturing operation, to its
processing, treatment, or ultimate disposal as a residual hazardous waste.
Curran, supra note 50, at 432.
56. SETAC, supra note 50, at xii. SETAC has formed a life-cycle assess-
ment advisory group to "identify[ ] the state of the art in [PLCAs] and [identify]
future research needs." Id.
57. INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 3.
58. Id. at 5; SETAC, supra note 50, at 1-2.
59. INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 5.
60. Curran, supra note 50, at 434.
61. Id.; SETAC, supra note 50, at xviii; INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note
51, at 7-8.
62. Curran, supra note 50, at 434.
63. Id. at 435.
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impacts can occur at any stage. By examining the impacts of a
product from "cradle-to-grave," analysts may at least identify
the relevant environmental trade-offs, even when there is no ad-
equate resolution. 64 In particular, PLCA may focus attention on
some of the "upstream" effects associated with energy and re-
source use, processing, and manufacturing. Beyond emphasiz-
ing that trade-offs exist in environmental choices, however,
technical and practical difficulties severely limit PLCA's useful-
ness as a policy tool. These limitations range from the mundane
task of gathering data to the dangers of interest group capture.
1. Limitations of PLCAs
a. Data Availability
Data may be unavailable either because they are confiden-
tial,65 or "because of a lack of a [necessary] methodology or re-
sources."66 One study found that PLCAs generally lacked a
meaningful discussion on their sources of information.67 Often,
the analyst may have to use highly generalized data to fill infor-
mational gaps. 68
b. Defining the Boundaries
Providing a "complete" assessment of the environmental im-
pacts of a product could become a herculean task without a rea-
sonable limit on the scope of the analysis.6 9 One commentator
stated that "in constructing an inventory for cloth diapers, the
analyst would need to decide whether to include the energy re-
quired to produce the fertilizer used to grow the cotton, and if so,
whether to assume hydroelectric or coal-based power."70 The
lack of any principled basis for defining the boundaries casts
doubt on the usefulness of the PLCA's conclusion.
c. Changing Technology or Product
Changes in a particular product's characteristics or the
technology or inputs in the manufacturing process could make a
64. Id.
65. INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 29-30, 59-60.
66. Curran, supra note 50, at 433-34.
67. INVENToRY GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 29-30, 59-65 (explaining that
few current studies adequately disclose or discuss data issues).
68. Id.
69. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GREEN PRODUCTS
BY DESIGN: CHOICES FOR A CLEANER ENVIRONMENT 61 (Sept. 1992).
70. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 221.
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PLCA for the product obsolete. 71 "If a few material or technol-
ogy inputs change, initial assumptions may no longer hold, and
the inventory might require a complete updating."72
d. Equivalency of Use
To compare the impacts of competing products, analysts
must develop "functional equivalency" ratios or "equivalent use"
ratios to account for different patterns of use.73 For example, a
PLCA comparing a ceramic mug and a polystyrene cup must cal-
culate the environmental impact on a per use basis; otherwise,
the ceramic mug's impact becomes overstated.74 Similarly, con-
sumers must use more plastic grocery sacks than paper sacks to
hold the same amount of groceries. 75 Thus, one PLCA assumed
a ratio of 1.5 or 2 polyethylene sacks to one paper sack, but there
is no guarantee that this assumption is correct. 76 Establishing
appropriate ratios depends on obtaining meaningful data about
consumer behavior, which raises the concerns regarding data
availability already noted.77
e. Expense
Performing complete PLCAs may become prohibitively ex-
pensive.78 The potential for abuse and the tentative conclusions
that PLCAs yield make the costs to complete a PLCA difficult to
justify.
f. Apples to Oranges Comparisons
"When assessing the environmental burdens of two prod-
ucts, the results typically show an 'apples-to-oranges' compari-
71. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 69, at 61.
72. Id.
73. INVENTORY GUmELINES, supra note 51, at 21-23.
74. The Dutch Ministry of the Environment recently performed a PLCA
comparing ceramic mugs, paper cups, and polystyrene cups. The study found
that the china cup would have to be used 1,800 times before the air pollution
contribution of the china cup fell below that of the polystyrene cup. Washed Up,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1992, at 58, 58.
75. FRANKLIN ASSocIATEs, LTD., supra note 30, at 1-2.
76. Id. (reporting ratios ranging from 1.2:1 to 3:1).
77. See supra notes 65-68 (discussing problems of data availability in
PLCAs).
1 78. Hannah Holmes, The Green Police: In the Environmental Holy War,
Who Can Tell the Good Guys from the Bad Guys?, GARBAGE, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at
44, 46; Solid Waste: EPA Says Life-Cycle Analysis May Hold Key to Assessment
of True Environmental Costs, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2223 (Apr. 12, 1991) [herein-
after Solid Waste]. See also Curran, supra note 50, at 433 (noting that PLCAs
"can be very costly to do").
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son."79 Translating these environmental risks into measurable,
comparable impacts becomes a monumentally difficult task. 0
Even if the PLCA accurately translates these results, localized
conditions may further skew the conclusions. For example, dis-
posable diapers may be appropriate in the West where water is
scarce, but cloth diapers may be appropriate in the East where
landfill space is scarce.81
g. Interest Group Capture
A PLCA may become subject to biases and arbitrary as-
sumptions.8 2 This means that "interest groups are free to em-
phasize the aspects most favorable to their own agendas,"83
particularly when PLCAs are privately funded.8 4 If PLCAs be-
come consistently captured, the public may lose faith in the
results.8 5
2. Using PLCAs in the Diaper Wars
The much-publicized "diaper wars" illustrates the difficul-
ties inherent in PLCA.8 6 In 1988, the National Association of
Diaper Services ("NADS") commissioned a study that concluded
that disposable diapers significantly contribute to the solid
79. Curran, supra note 50 at 433.
80. Id.; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 69, at 61; Solid
Waste, supra note 78, at 2222-23.
81. Holmes, supra note 78, at 46-47; Which are Best for the Environment?,
supra note 54, at 556.
82. Selling Green, 56 CONSUMER REP. 687, 691-92 (1991); Solid Waste,
supra note 78, at 2223 ("The usefulness and credibility of [PLCA] to the public
is threatened by varying deficiencies in methodology. [Such deficiencies] let you
come out with virtually any result you want.'" (quoting Richard Denison of the
EDF)); see also Hannah Holmes, Science for Sale, GARBAGE, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at
46-47 (discussing the favorable results of a PLCA funded by the plastics'
industry)
83. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 69, at 61.
84. "'Any analyst worth her salt can make a [PILCA produce results
favorable to a sponsor through judicious choice of modeling assumptions, data,
and especially through careful framing of the questions that the study is meant
to answer.'" Holmes, supra note 78, at 50 (quoting Reid Lifset, Associate Direc-
tor of Yale University's Project on Solid Waste and the Environment).
85. Solid Waste, supra note 78, at 2223 (comments of Richard Denison of
the EDF).
86. See generally Which are Best for the Environment?, supra note 54, at
555 (summarizing the reasons behind the controversy and citing studies by Ar-
thur D. Little, Inc.; Franklin Associates, Ltd.; and Lehrburger, Mullen, and
Jones); Fierman, supra note 29, at 91 (calling the problem "the great diaper
dilemma" and quoting Allen Hershkowitz, a senior scientist at the National Re-
sources Defense Council, as saying "[tihe diaper debate is unresolvable").
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waste crisis.8 7 In response, state legislatures proposed drastic
measures, including diaper taxes, warning labels, and outright
bans.88 Members of the disposable diaper industry responded
vigorously with the American Paper Institute8 9 and Proctor &
Gamble 9° performing PLCAs of cloth and disposable diapers.
These assessments, not surprisingly, concluded that the envi-
ronmentally correct choice between disposable diapers and cloth
diapers was ambiguous, but arguably favored disposable
diapers. 91 Accordingly, the API Study concluded that disposable
diapers use less pre-consumer solid waste than cloth diapers.92
NADS then commissioned its own PLCA ("NADS Study")93
which concluded that cloth diapers, when laundered by a diaper
service, are better for the environment than disposable
diapers. 94
The differing results reached in the two PLCAs reflect their
capture by respective sponsors. Several key assumptions ac-
count for the differing conclusions. The NADS Study omitted
the energy use and environmental impact of transporting cloth
diapers to consumers. 95 The NADS Study also assumed that
fifty percent of disposable diaper users and five percent of those
using cloth diaper laundry services flush fecal matter before dis-
posal.96 The API Study assumed that only five percent of dis-
posable diapers users and fifty percent of cloth diaper users
performed this task.97 Based on those assumptions, the API
87. CARL LEHRBURGER, DIAPERS IN THE WASTE STREAM: A REVIEW OF
WASTE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES (1989).
88. MENELL, supra note 10, at 34; Adam Smith's Money World: Green Mar-
keting: Hype or Hope (WNET television broadcast, Apr. 12, 1991).
89. FRANKLiN ASSOCIATES, LTD., ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE
ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S SINGLE USE AND CLOTH DIAPERS (Revised Report)
(1992) [hereinafter API STUDY] (report to the American Paper Institute Diaper
Manufacturers Group).
90. ARTHUR D. LrrTLE, INC., DISPOSABLE VERSUS REUSABLE DIAPERS:
HEALTH, E viRoNmENTAL AND ECONOMIC COMPARISONS, REFERENCE No. 64190
(1990) [hereinafter P & G STUDY] (report to Proctor and Gamble).
91. API STUDY, supra note 89, at 1-19 to 1-20; P & G STUDY, supra note 90,
at I-1.
92. API Study, supra note 89, at 3-11, 3-16 to 3-18.
93. CARL LEHRBURGER ET AL., DIAPERS: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND LIFE-
CYCLE ANALYSIS (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter NADS STUDY] (report for National As-
sociation of Diaper Services). The P & G and NADS studies were discussed in
Adam Smith's Money World: Green Marketing: Hype or Hope? (WNET televi-
sion broadcast, Apr. 12, 1991).
94. NADS STUDY, supra note 93, at 5-7.
95. Id. at 21, 24, 32.
96. Id. at 84, 85.
97. API STUDY, supra note 89, at 1-6.
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study concluded that cloth services used 5,921.9 gallons of
water,98 while the NADS Study concluded that cloth services
used 1,376.4 gallons of water.99
The PLCAs also used different energy usage assumptions.
The P & G Study found that cloth diaper usage consumes three
times more energy than usage of disposable diapers,100 while
the NADS Study found that usage of disposable diapers
consumes seventy percent more energy than usage of cloth
diapers. 1 1 The environmental benefit of co-generation accounts
for much of the difference in energy consumption,10 2 The P & G
Study counted co-generation as an energy credit, thereby reduc-
ing energy consumption.' 0 3 In contrast, the NADS Study did
not provide any credit because it assumed that co-generation
produced air pollution. 0 4
The subjective assumptions and decisions in the diaper
studies pointedly display the inherent limitations of PLCA. At-
tempts to measure the environmental accuracy of claims and the
"cradle-to-grave" environmental impacts of products are lauda-
ble. The scientific community, however, has not yet developed a
consensus concerning how to measure environmental impacts to
devise appropriate solutions to the environmental crisis. With-
out a scientific consensus, consumer confusion and distrust of
manufacturers' environmental claims is not surprising. Indeed,
this lack of trust indicates that the market for information func-
tions efficiently. 0 5
C. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADvERTISING POLICY
Advocates of increased regulation commonly assert that
consumer purchasing decisions can help resolve the environ-
mental externality problem.' 0 6 The externality problem arises
because society bears a portion of the firm's environmental costs
98. Id. at 3-21 (based on 10 diapers per day).
99. NADS Srtmy supra note 93, at 85.
100. P & G STUDY, supra note 90, at 5-9.
101. NADS S=tjnY, supra note 93, at 21.
102. Curran, supra note 50, at 433. Co-generation is a process to create en-
ergy through incineration from soiled diapers. For an explanation of the pulp
and paper manufacturing operation, see P & G S-Dy, supra note 90, at V-9, V-
10.
103. P & G STUDy, supra note 90, at 5-9.
104. NADS STUDy, supra note 93, at 21.
105. See supra note 12 (describing efficient market for the purposes of this
Article).
106. Pollution and environmental impacts associated with manufacturing
are classic examples of externalities. See WILLL m J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
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related to pollution and other environmental problems. These
social costs are external to the firm's profit maximizing deci-
sions, which results in inefficiently high output. If consumer
purchasing decisions or environmental regulations could force
firms to consider environmental costs (i.e., to internalize the
costs of pollution), then pollution and output would reduce to an
efficient level.
Many commentators and regulators thus argue for in-
creased regulation of environmental advertising and labelling to
address consumer uncertainty. The Green Report II responded
to the call for increased regulation of environmental advertising
and labelling by favoring "uniform definitions" for terms such as
degradable, compostable, recycled, and recyclable.107 Such a
definitional approach, however, requires that regulators make
decisions concerning environmental policy before establishing
uniform definitions.108 As a result, consumers would receive
only information consistent with the underlying environmental
policy.
Other commentators have proposed alternatives that would
turn green marketing into a tool to accomplish environmental
regulatory policies. For example, Jamie Grodsky advocates
granting the EPA the authority to establish binding minimum
threshold requirements. 10 9 Grodsky suggests that "it may be
impossible to prevent deceptive environmental advertising in a
meaningful way without concurrently promoting environmental
policy goals."' 10 Using the example of "recycled," Grodsky ar-
gues that the FTC Guidelines lack adequately explicit minimum
threshold requirements. He states:
[The FTC Guidelines] allow manufacturers to add together pre- and
post-consumer waste in disclosing the percentage of a product that is
recycled material. Although recycling of pre-consumer materials can
be relatively energy efficient and should be encouraged, a definition
such as this depresses the demand for post-consumer materials and
reduces incentives for new consumer recycling programs.1
1 1
OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE QUALITY OF LiFE 75-79
(1979).
107. GREEN REPORT II, supra note 4, at 1.
108. BEALEs & Muis, supra note 10, at 91.
109. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 167-72. Grodsky would impose minimum
standards for terms such as "recycled," and permit the terms such as "recycl-
able," "degradable," and "compostable" only when appropriate facilities are lo-
cally available. Id. at 156, 167-72.
110. Id. at 172.
111. Id. at 175.
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Similarly, Stephen Gardner, a former Assistant Attorney
General from Texas, suggests that "[alny product that is called
'recyclable' must indeed be recyclable in each locality where the
claim appears."112 Other commentators trumpet the virtue of
environmental advertising where it is "consistent with sound en-
vironmental policy"113 and where each term means "the same
thing on every product making that representation.""14
These commentators and regulators appear willing to ma-
nipulate the market to accomplish undefined environmental pol-
icies. Indeed, the Green Report II views the market as "a
powerful tool that can be used" to achieve environmental objec-
tives. 1 5 Senator Frank Lautenberg, the main proponent of fed-
eral legislation, asserts that "a free market relies on [common]
standards and depends on free and accurate information."116
Yet his proposed legislation establishes a series of "single mean-
ing" definitions that would restrict information made available
to consumers.17
Both the Green Report II and Senator Lautenberg fail to
consider that advertising regulations may fail to achieve envi-
ronmental policy goals. Consumer purchasing decisions may do
little to affect the environmental externality problem. 8 Peter
Menell has argued that the price system incorporates environ-
mental impacts better than either the EPA's "Reduce, Reuse and
Recycle" principles or reliance on environmental advertising."19
Even more pessimistic that advertising can accomplish environ-
mental goals through consumer purchases, Howard Latin con-
cludes that "decentralized decisionmaking" by consumers will
prove "extremely inefficient" in the context of "environmental
consumption." 20 In other words, consumers cannot gather suf-
112. Gardner, supra note 10, at 56.
113. Downs, supra note 10, at 158.
114. Watman, supra note 10, at 174; see also Luehr, supra note 10, at 331
(discussing uniform definitions for environmental marketing terms).
115. GREEN REPORT II, supra note 4, at v.
116. Lautenberg, supra note 10, at 309.
117. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(3) (1991).
118. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing environmental
externality).
119. MENELL, supra note 10, at 3-4 (using life-cycle analysis and modified
life-cycle analysis to gauge the environmental impact of products).
120. Latin, supra note 27, at 189-90. Latin identifies five potential obstacles
to an exclusively free market approach to pollution control: 1) consumers are
ignorant of the environmental consequences of their purchases, and the com-
plexity of environmental information prohibits them from obtaining adequate
knowledge; 2) producers cannot determine which attributes of a product (price,
quality, environmental efficiency) are decisive in stimulating a purchase; 3) a
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ficient information to make "efficient" decisions, and, even if
they could, producers do not efficiently supply such
information. 12 1
We do not know, however, how a well-informed consumer
would prioritize environmental issues or how those priorities
would affect purchasing decisions. Consumers have only re-
cently expressed a willingness to spend extra money for environ-
mental attributes. Increased demand for environmental
attributes will create added incentives for consumers and produ-
cers to gather and disseminate information. As consumers
gather more information, in part through sellers' advertising ef-
forts, consumer purchasing decisions may positively affect the
internalization of external environmental costs. 122 One com-
mentator points to altering consumer behavior as a necessary
condition to achieve additional gains in "environmental im-
provements."1 23 In addition, given the scientific community's
single price cannot adequately convey reliable environmental information, be-
cause the potential environmental impacts along the production/use/disposal
cycle of a product are too numerous; therefore, consumers cannot distinguish
environmental efficiency from other factors controlling price; 4) difficulties in
identifying and valuing externalities prohibit their internalization by produ-
cers; and 5) producers do not possess the environmental information necessary
to inform the consumer; obtaining this information would be prohibitively ex-
pensive for producers and, even if they had it, there is no incentive to publish it.
Id.
121. Both Menell and Latin focus on the cognitive ability of consumers to
process the relevant information. Latin, supra note 27, at 190-204; MENELL,
supra note 10, at 9-13. Both authors recognize that the market is sensitive to
such cognitive limitations. Latin and Menell also focus on more traditional
market-based limitations, such as consumer and environmental externalities
and free riding problems. MENELL, supra note 10, at 13-14; Latin, supra note
27, at 211-17. Indeed, the economics of information, explored in the next sec-
tion, may be seen as a way of modeling the market's response to cognitive limi-
tations. See infra notes 133-163 and accompanying text (discussing basic
principles of the economics of information).
122. Because differences between public perception and "expert" opinions on
the environment are often explained by misperceptions by the public, additional
information may correct some of those misperceptions. See, e.g., William L
Stevens, What Really Threatens the Environment?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1991,
at C4 (discussing disparities between public's and scientists' perceptions of vari-
ous environmental risks).
123. See James Paul Kimmel, Jr., Disclosing the Environmental Impact of
Human Activities: How a Federal Pollution Control Program Based on Individ-
ual Decision Making and Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the Environ-
mental Goals of the 1970s in the 1990s, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 505, 539 (1989)
("Commentators and some governmental and regulatory officials are beginning
to realize that further environmental improvements are contingent upon
changing the behavior of businesses and individuals.").
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lack of consensus on environmental impacts,124 consumers may
make the environmentally correct decision on their own. For ex-
ample, "paper versus plastic" is a difficult decision and either
choice may be "correct."
Recognizing that consumer decisions may deviate from pol-
icy goals, commentators and legislators who address green mar-
keting are unwilling to rely on an educated and informed
consumer. These commentators implicitly assume that consum-
ers will not, or can not, make "appropriate" decisions. Because
they will not rely on consumer choice, these commentators at-
tempt to manipulate (or define) the messages conveyed to con-
sumers in order to insure that purchasing decisions advance the
"correct" policy goals. Aside from destroying consumer auton-
omy and acting with undue paternalism, this approach lacks
internal consistency because it manipulates and guides con-
sumer purchasing decisions under the guise of advertising regu-
lation. In other words, to accomplish environmental policy
goals, truth becomes irrelevant. The only relevant consideration
becomes whether consumer decisions match the commentators'
perspective.
If the regulation of environmental advertising is an ineffi-
cient tool for implementing environmental policy, 125 one might
conclude that we should ban such advertising altogether. After
all, consumer purchases inconsistent with regulatory goals
would compromise environmental policy. 126 Aside from the ob-
vious First Amendment difficulties with an outright ban, 17 en-
124. See supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text (discussing lack of con-
sensus about environmental impacts).
125. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text (discussing Latin and
Menell).
126. If consumers make purchases inconsistent with regulatory policy, the
business entity faces inconsistent incentives. Consumers may desire paper con-
tainers while regulatory policy may favor plastic.
127. The California statute, entitled Environmental Representations Relat-
ing to Consumer Goods and adopting uniform definitions of environmental
terms, has been challenged on First Amendment grounds. Association of Natl
Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Judge Patel of
the Northern District of California found that the statute was an acceptable
restriction on commercial speech. Id. at 759. The statutory definition of "re-
cyclable," however, was found unconstitutionally vague because there was no
guidance concerning when a consumer good could be "conveniently recycled."
Id. at 761-62.
In the course of the opinion, the court made it very clear that categorical
bans of green claims would be constitutionally infirm, declaring.
If First Amendment scrutiny in the commercial speech arena is to have
any bite at all, a legislative body cannot justify its restrictions on com-
mercial speech simply by declaring that marketing claims are mislead-
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vironmental advertising provides several benefits. For example,
consumers maximize welfare when they can purchase products
having preferred attributes. 128 Even when the preferred attri-
bute contradicts regulatory goals, the individual consumer still
benefits from purchasing that attribute.129 In addition, the in-
trinsic benefits from the free flow of ideas exist even when those
ideas come from advertising. 30 Although consumers may not
cause manufacturers to internalize the social costs of pollution,
the information conveyed by advertising may foster discussion
and may even promote grassroots environmentalism. 13 1 Critics
ing... For this reason, the court cannot say that due to their allegedly
misleading nature, the commercial messages at issue are not protected
by the First Amendment at all.
Id. at 755; see also Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (holding a ban of promotional advertising by utility unconstitutional, de-
spite state's legitimate interest in energy conservation).
128. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON.
213 (1961) (assuming that price is the only relevant product attribute). See also
ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION (David G. Tuerck ed.,
1978) (discussing effects of advertising on consumers and on the market); Jason
W. Gray-Lee et al., Review of Legal Standards for Environmental Marketing
Claims, 13 J. PUB. PoL'Y & MARKETING 155 (1994) (reviewing exdsting regula-
tions of environmental advertising); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer
Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) [hereinafter Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior] (discussing effects of advertising on consumer behavior);
Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. EcoN. 729 (1974) [herein-
after Nelson, Advertising as Information] (discussing advertising as
information).
129. This is not to say that imperfect information might not lead to imper-
fect (or wrong) choices by consumers. As Latin recognizes, "[p]erfect recognition
of preferences combined with imperfect information may lead to imperfect deci-
sions that fail to produce desired outcomes." Latin, supra note 27, at 192. How-
ever, as the prior section reveals, there is no scientific consensus concerning the
environmental impact of products. See supra part H.A-B. The consumer may
reach a different but nonetheless rational and desirable decision that produces
the desired effect.
130. See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
119 (1989) (discussing various justifications). First Amendment scholars iso-
late a "search for truth" rationale, arguing that only by allowing speech may
truthful ideas drive out false ideas. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Another rationale justifying free speech is the "Millian Principle" or the
view that individuals are sovereign and autonomous and have no obligation to
believe that the decrees of the state are correct. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory
of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-18 (1972) ("[Tlhe powers
of a state are limited to those that citizens could recognize while still regarding
themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.") (later recanted on other
grounds in Thomas Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expres-
sion, 40 U. PITT. L. REv. 519, 532-33 (1979)).
131. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 10, at 239-40 (discussing positive benefits
of trustworthy information and the negative effects of misinformation); cf Vin-
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counter that the lack of uniformity in definitions will cause con-
sumers to become cynical and stop participating in the environ-
mental movement.13 2 Once again, these critics would prefer to
have consumer participation based on deception and manipula-
tion rather than trust consumers to recognize and account for
the inevitable environmental tradeoffs. For grassroots environ-
mentalism to develop and have a positive effect, however, it
should be based upon truth, and truth is not promoted by pro-
viding uniform definitions when there is no consensus concern-
ing the underlying policy.
HI. THE ECONOMICS OF GREEN MARKETING:
CONSUMER CONFUSION IS RATIONAL
A. THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: BASIc PRINCIPLES
The Economics of Information ("EOI") is a useful paradigm
for analyzing advertising's role in the marketplace. 13 3 Informa-
tion, like any economic good, has a price that reflects the prefer-
ences and costs of providing it. EOI recognizes that information
is costly to produce, disseminate, and process.' 3 4 At some point,
therefore, providing additional information no longer becomes
socially desirable. 13 5
cent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988) (discuss-
ing Brandeis' viewpoint that the rationale for free speech is to promote activ-
ism). Given the competition and uncertainty in the scientific community
concerning appropriate environmental policy, it seems particularly important
to allow competitors in the product market to tout the environmental advan-
tages of its product. For example, if McDonald's chooses to emphasize the envi-
ronmental benefits of polystyrene, see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying
text, or if disposable diaper manufacturers want to tout the environmental ben-
efits of their product, the advertisement may foster discussion of the relevant
policy issues. This Article, and the citations contained in it, are evidence that
advertising claims will indeed foster discussion.
132. See infra notes 232-233 and accompanying text (discussing effects of
consumer confusion brought on by advertising).
133. The classic statement of the economics of information is George J. Stig-
ler's The Economics of Information. See Stigler, supra note 128.
134. Id; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE
FTC 3-10 (1973) (discussing problems relating to consumer information).
135. POSNER, supra note 134, at 4 (discussing the cost to the consumer of
gathering information about a product); Ralph L Winter, Jr., Advertising and
Legal Theory, in IssuEs IN ADvERTIsING: TiE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION, supra
note 128, at 19 ("Because the collection and transmittal of product information
consumes resources, the attainment of perfect information, even if possible,
would be prohibitively expensive for consumers."); see also Stigler, supra note
128, at 213 (analyzing the problem of searching for information regarding the
" ascertainment of market price").
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To make purchasing decisions conform to their preferences,
consumers will seek information concerning product attrib-
utes.136 Consumers may obtain such information by gathering
information themselves from inspection, observation, and expe-
rience; purchasing information from intermediaries such as
journalists or other media sources; receiving information
through advertising or third party certifications; from competing
sellers; or by benefiting from information gathering activities of
others through recommendations, reputation, and other market
signals. 137 Economists refer to this process of gathering infor-
mation as "search."138
Advertising plays a vital role in this process because it may
reduce costs of the search. 139 For certain types of information,
including information concerning environmental impacts of
products, sellers possess a comparative advantage in producing
and providing that information. 140 Consumer utility increases
when the seller provides such information, and advertising is
often the most efficient mechanism for disseminating this
information.' 4 '
Sellers will provide information, through advertising or
some other source, only when it is cost-effective to do so.' 42 Ac-
cordingly, a seller's decision to supply information responds to
the buyer's demand for such information to assist in choosing
136. In other words, the demand for information is derived from the demand
for product attributes. Lester G. Telser, Towards a Theory of the Economics of
Advertising, in ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION, supra
note 128, at 71 (arguing that advertising is a joint product together with the
goods or services); Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 3 J.L. & ECON. 491, 501 (1981). The classic statement on the eco-
nomics of information is Stigler, supra note 128. Stigler assumes price is the
only relevant product attribute.
137. Beales et al., supra note 136, at 501; see also infra notes 267-273 and
accompanying text (discussing market signals).
138. Search costs are emphasized in Stigler, supra note 128.
139. The role of advertising as a source of information is discussed in Nel-
son, Advertising as Information, supra note 128; Nelson, Information and Con-
sumer Behavior, supra note 128; Telser, supra note 136.
140. Winter, supra note 135, at 19; POSNER, supra note 134, at 4.
141. Winter, supra note 135, at 19.
142. Michael E. Porter, Optimal Advertising: An Intra-Industry Approach,
in IssUEs IN ADVERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION, supra note 128, at
91, passim; MICHAEL E. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEGY AND BILATERAL
MARIET POWER, passim (1976); Robert Dorfman & Peter Steiner, Optimal Ad-
vertising and Optimal Quality, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 826 (1954); Nelson, Informa-
tion and Consumer Behavior, supra note 128, passim; Lester G. Telser,
Advertising and Competition, 63 J. POL. ECON. 2 (1964).
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among competing products. 143 Consequently, the amount of in-
formation advertising supplies will depend on a number of fac-
tors: the availability of information provided through other
sources; the behavior of competitors; the market conditions for
the product; and the relative costs of generating and disseminat-
ing the information.'4 In a well functioning market, sellers
have an incentive to provide information concerning a specific
product attribute when consumers prefer products with that
attribute. 45
The recognition that there exists a market for information
has very important policy implications. Because providing infor-
mation involves a cost, "perfect" or complete information is
neither attainable nor desirable. 146 To maximize expected util-
ity, consumers will search until the marginal expected cost of
the search equals the marginal expected return, i.e., only to the
point where the search remains cost effective. Similarly, a seller
will continue to advertise so long as the profit from higher sales
produced by such advertising offsets the cost of that advertising.
The market-clearing level of information is a function of supply
and demand. 147 Because consumers and sellers will operate
with incomplete information, uncertainty concerning the mean-
ing of advertising claims and some consumer fraud will persist.
To isolate the types of product attributes likely to involve
high search costs, economists divide product attributes into
three categories: search qualities, experience qualities, and
credence qualities. 148 Consumers determine "search" qualities
before making a purchase, but can evaluate "experience" quali-
ties only through normal use of the product. 49 The third type,
"credence" qualities, require "additional costly information" be-
143. Porter, supra note 142, at 92; see also supra note 136 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the consumer's search for product information).
144. Porter, supra note 142, at 92. Porter emphasizes that the availability
of alternative sources of information influences the "buyer's information equi-
librium," which in turn affects the firm's marketing strategy. Id.
145. See infra notes 165-241 and accompanying text (discussing environ-
mental advertising).
146. See sources cited at supra note 142 (discussing cost of information).
147. This is the entire basis of the "search" model. See infra notes 148-152
and accompanying text (discussing consumer assessment of categories of prod-
uct attributes).
148. See infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (defining "search," "ex-
perience," and "credence" qualities).
149. The division between "search" and "experience" qualities is emphasized
in a series of articles by Phillip Nelson. See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as In-
formation Once More, in IssuEs IN ADvERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUA-
SION, supra note 128, at 133; Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra note
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cause they "cannot be evaluated in normal use."150 A credence
quality arises "whenever a good is utilized in combination with
other goods of uncertain properties." 151 In this context, environ-
mental benefits are therefore a joint product along with other
product attributes.152
Sellers generally do not use false or misleading advertising
to affect consumers' perceptions of search qualities because "[i]f
the advertised properties of the product differ from the actual
properties, the consumer will know about that difference prior to
purchase."153 With respect to experience qualities, "[t]he major
control that consumers have over the market.., is whether they
repeat the purchase of a brand or not."154 When sellers depend
on repeat purchases, or when experience information is avail-
able from non-advertising sources, misleading advertising is not
likely. Assessing a credence quality, however, requires addi-
tional costly information. Consumer ignorance and the cost of
obtaining information from non-seller sources may provide sell-
ers with an incentive to defraud consumers concerning credence
qualities. 55
The relatively higher cost of evaluating environmental
information has led many commentators to conclude that envi-
ronmental attributes are credence qualities.' 56 These commen-
tators contend that regulation of environmental claims has
become necessary to correct market failure in disseminating ac-
curate environmental information. Many environmental attrib-
utes, however, are not credence qualities, but search qualities.
For example, one brand's use of less packaging than a competi-
128, passim; Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, supra note 128,
passim.
150. "Credence" qualities are discussed in Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni,
Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69
(1973). One commentator argues that credence qualities should be divided into
"credence performance claims" and "faith claims." Ross D. PETTY, THE IMPACT
OF ADVERTISING LAW ON BusNssS AND PUBLIC POLICY 36-38 (1992). Under this
scheme, environmental claims would probably be considered "faith" claims be-
cause they do not directly relate to product performance. Id. For our purposes,
this additional distinction is not particularly revealing. For all credence claims
additional information is necessary. As the rest of this Article demonstrates,
such information is available.
151. Darby & Karni, supra note 150, at 69.
152. See id.
153. Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra note 128, at 730.
154. Id.
155. Darby & Karni, sitpra note 150, at 69-72.
156. See, e.g., PETTY, supra note 150, at 37-38 (defining "faith credence qual-
ities" as including claims concerning public policy issues); Gray-Lee et al., supra
note 128, at 155.
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live brand is an observable attribute. In communities that have
curbside recycling programs, the "acceptable materials" list pro-
vides valuable information. Alternative sources of information
that decrease the risk of misleading advertising claims, such as
independent certifications 157 and market signals,158 have also
become readily available.
In addition, the cost of obtaining environmental infor-
mation is not as high as these commentators suggest. A great
deal of relevant information exists through non-advertising
media sources. For instance, when the evening news reported
that alar on apples creates a health risk, consumers responded
to that information.159 In the market for environmental infor-
mation, publishers, 160 broadcast news,' 61 and other sources
157. See infra notes 242-266 and accompanying text (discussing independ-
ent certifications).
158. See infra notes 267-281 and accompanying text (discussing market
signals).
159. For discussions of the alar controversy, see Sarah Henry, An Apple a
Day: Use of Growth Regulator, Daminozide, 91 TECH. REV. 11 (1988); Casey
Burko, EPA Cites Peril from Apple a Day, CI. Tam., Aug. 30, 1985, at Cl; Cass
Peterson, EPA Findings Could Upset Apple Cart, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1986, at
A13; Bill Stokes, An Apple Question Adam Never Faced, CHI. TRIB., June 26,
1988, at C7; The Risks of Growing Better Apples, NAT'L J., Dec. 14, 1985, at
2850; Michael Weisskopf, EPA: Back Toward Ban on Apple Treatment?, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 1988, at A21; Winston Williams, Polishing the Apple's Image,
N.Y. Tm Is, May 25, 1986, § 3, at 4.
160. Publishers have produced many books on the environment for the lay
public; examples include: LESTER E. BROWN, THE WORLD WATCH READER ON
GLOBAL ENVIROmENTAL ISSUES (1991); DEBRA LYNN DADD, THE NoNToxic
HOME & OFFICE: PROTECTING YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY FROM EVERYDAY
TOXICS AND HEALTH HAZARDs (1992); DEBRA LYNN DADD, NoNToXIc, NATURAL
AND EARTHWIsE: How TO PROTECT YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY FROM HARMFuL
PRODUCTS AND LIVE IN HARmONY WITH THE EARTH (1990); ALAN DuRNiNG, How
MUCH Is ENOUGH: THE CONSUMER SOCIETY AND THE FUTURE OF THE EARTH
(1992); THE EARTHWORxS GROUP, 50 SIMPLE THINGS KIDS CAN Do To RECYCLE
(1994); THE EARTwoms GROUP, THE RECYCLER'S HANDBOOK: SIMPLE THINGS
You CAN Do (1990); ELKINGTON ET AL., supra note 26; BENJAmIN A. GOLDMAN,
THE TRUTH ABOUT WHERE YOU LIVE: AN ATLAS FOR ACTION ON ToxINs AND
MORTALITY (1991); DONNELLA H. MEADowS ET AL., BEYOND THE LIMiTs: CON-
FRONTING GLOBAL COLLAPSE, ENVISIONING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1992); JOHN
NAAR, DESIGN FOR A LIVABLE PLANET: How You CAN HELP CLEAN Up THE ENvI-
RON ENT (1990); GARY NULL, CLEARER, CLEANER, SAFER, GREENER: A
BLUEPRINT FOR DETOXIFYING YOUR ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1992); DIx= LEE RAY,
TRASHING THE PLANET: How SCIENCE CAN HELP Us DEAL WiTH ACID RAIN, DE-
PLETION OF THE OzoNE, AND NUCLEAR WASTE (AMONG OTHER THINGS) (1990);
JOHN THOMPSON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ENTREPRENEUR: WHERE To FIND THE
PROFIT IN SAVING THE EARTH (1992); MICHAEL VIDER & PAT HILTON, 365 WAYS
FOR YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN TO SAVE THE EARTH ONE DAY AT A TM (1991);
JOHN F. WASuc, THE GREEN SUPERMLARKET SHOPPING GUIDE (1993).
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devoted to environmental issues 162 provide a great deal of
information.
Consumer uncertainty becomes a problem, of course, when
consumers make faulty purchasing decisions based upon the ex-
isting information. 163 As the next section reveals, consumers
recognize the risk of fraud and discount the message accord-
ingly. Given the great deal of scientific uncertainty surrounding
the environmental impact of products, discounting or ignoring
many of those claims may be appropriate; if the environmental
impact of "paper v. plastic" is unclear, then perhaps consumers
should purchase the product displaying other desirable attrib-
utes. Moreover, consumers will ignore environmental claims
when the cost of evaluating such claims is prohibitive.164
B. TE EcoNoMics OF ENvmoNMENTAL INFORMATION:
ENVIRONMENTAL ADvERTISING FOR FUN AND PROFIT
EOI predicts that when consumers consider environmental
attributes and demand more environmental information, sellers
react by advertising the environmental benefits of their prod-
ucts. 6 5 In addition, the EOI search model predicts that uncer-
161. Several television programs have introduced "green market" reports as
part of their news reporting. See, e.g., Earth Matters: Scared Green (CNN tele-
vision broadcast, Aug. 29, 1993) (describing increasing popularity of children's
books with environmental themes); Business World (ABC television broadcast,
Sept. 1, 1991) (describing earnings increases and public relations benefits when
fiber manufacturer began making recycled paper products); Adam Smith (PBS
television broadcast, Apr. 12, 1991) (reporting on increasing use of environmen-
tal claims in marketing and advertising); World News Tonight With Peter Jen-
nings (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 12, 1990) (describing U.S. canned tuna
industry's decision not to purchase tuna from fishing operations using nets that
kill dolphins); World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broad-
cast, Mar. 29, 1990) (describing trash bag manufacturer's decision to cease erro-
neous claims that product was biodegradable).
162. Some magazines that focus on or report frequently on environmental
issues include: Archives of Environmental Health; BioCycle; Buzzworm: The
Environmental Journal; E: The Environmental Magazine; Environment: EPA
Journal; Garbage; Practical Journal for the Environment; Harrowsmith; Jour-
nal of Environmental Education; One Person's Impact.
163. If additional information could be made available more cheaply, then
consumer purchases would more accurately reflect their preferences. However,
none of the current proposals accomplishes this task. Indeed, increased regula-
tion will increase the cost of advertising and restrict the flow of information.
See infra notes 464-465 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 133-135 (discussing impracticality of obtaining perfect
information).
165. See supra notes 136-145 and accompanying text (discussing market ef-
fects of consumer search for information). One survey conducted by Marketing
Intelligence Service revealed that in 1993, "13.0% of all new product intros had
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tainty and mistrust should be highest where the cost of
obtaining information to evaluate the claim is highest.
Although the data are far from complete, survey evidence
reveals that the green market is consistent with EOI.
Strong consumer preference for environmental attributes
encourages an increasing number of companies to advertise the
environmental benefits of their products. The percentage of new
products marketed in the United States with packages, labels,
or advertising containing environmental claims increased from
5.9% in 1989 to 11.4% in the first half of 1992.166 Many manu-
facturers that have produced environmentally sensitive prod-
ucts or packaging for years have begun to tout these
attributes.167 Some reports estimate that the green market gen-
erates between twenty-five billion and fifty billion dollars a year
in sales.168 Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey,
I]I has characterized the growth in environmental claims as a
"green revolution." 69
Environmental claims generally fall into discrete categories
and many terms recur frequently.'70 Many consumers do not
one or more environmental claims attached to them, up from 11.3% in 1992,
12.6% in 1991, and 10.1% in 1990 .... For the second half of 1993, 13.3% of new
product introductions made green claims, up from 12.8% for the January-June
period." Green Product Intros Still Climbing, GREEN MARKETALERT, June 1994,
available in Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database.
166. EVALUATION OF ErmoNvENrAL MARKETING TERmS, supra note 13, at
35. The percentage peaked at 12.4% in 1991. Environmental Management Sur-
vey, GREEN MARKETALERT, July 1993, available in Westlaw, PTS-Promt
Database (reporting Coopers & Lybrand survey, which found "57% of compa-
nies believe consumers factor environmental criteria into purchasing
decisions").
167. Fierman, supra note 29, at 96; John Holusha, Coming Clean on Goods:
Ecology Claims Faulted, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 12, 1991, at D1.
168. Casey Bukro, Watchdogs Seeing Red Over 'Green" Labeling: Environ-
mental Certification Blasted, Cm. TRm., Oct. 29, 1991, at 1. But see Joseph M.
Winski, Big Prizes, But No Easy Answers, ADvERTIsING AGE, Oct. 28, 1991, at
GR-3 (reporting estimates that green market currently at $1.8 billion and pro-
jecting growth to $8.8 billion by 1995); Why the Environment is "Strategic,"
GREEN MARKETALERT, July 1993, available in Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database
("Banque Panibas estimates the market for environmental goods and services is
more than $700 billion per year in OECD countries.").
169. Hearings on S. 976 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection
of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 71
45 (1991).
170. See EVALUATION OF ENvrRoNmENTAL MARKETING TERMs, supra note 13,
at 29-70. The EPA searched the Productscan database (owned by Marketing
Intelligence Service, Ltd. of Naples, N.Y.) for some of the common environmen-
tal terms. Id. at 30. Productscan contains reports of 6000 new products, as well
as products that have been substantially changed, repackaged, or relabeled. Id.
The search involved 56 terms that were organized into 10 claim types. Id. at
1994]
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understand the meaning of certain green marketing terms, in
spite of their frequent use. Consumers, producers, environmen-
tal groups, and other experts have not provided concrete defini-
tions of terms such as "degradable" (including photo-degradable
and bio-degradable), "compostable," "recyclable," "recycled," "re-
usable/refillable," and "ozone friendly." Similarly, terms such as
"environmentally friendly," "environmentally safe," "natural,"
and "green" have also created a great deal of confusion. The rest
of this subsection summarizes statistics of frequently used envi-
ronmental claims and discusses the confusion they can
create. 171
1. Solid Waste Related Claims
Claims such as "recycled," "recyclable," and "degradable" re-
late to consumer efforts to reduce or eliminate the volume of
solid waste. 7 2 In 1990 and 1991, solid waste related claims ac-
counted for forty percent and forty-five percent of environmental
claims made for new products, respectively.' 7 3 Although these
terms relate to solid waste, their meanings are ambiguous.
31. The results reported in the text are based on searches using all search
terms. Id. at 33. I have highlighted a non-random sample. In addition, I have
taken some literary license in characterizing the terms as a certain "claim-
type." These changes will be highlighted when relevant. The EPA warns that
there are shortcomings in the Productscan database, however. For instance,
the database did not measure environmental claims until 1987. Id. at 31.
Some terms, such as "recycled," "recyclable," "biodegradable," and "no pesti-
cides" were not added until 1990. Id. at 31-32. As a result, the increase in
frequency of environmental claims attributable to Earth Day 1990 may be over-
stated. Finally, some types of products were excluded, such as books (which
may claim use of recycled paper), gasoline ("reformulated" claims), and durable
goods (such as "energy efficient" refrigerators). Id. at 31. Despite these limita-
tions, the EPA claims that the Productscan database is the "best single source
for systematically measuring environmental marketing claims in the packaged
goods market." Id. at 34.
171. At least one source of confusion is not discussed in this section. Con-
sumers may be confused about whether a claim applies to a product or its pack-
age. The FTC recommends that an environmental claim "should be presented
in a way that makes clear whether the environmental attribute or benefit being
asserted refers to the product, the product's packaging or to a portion or compo-
nent of the product or packaging." Guides for the Use of Environmental Mar-
keting Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260.66 (1994).
172. Less commonly used solid-waste reduction claims, particularly those
involving packages that can be refilled, may be increasing. See The Majors
March into Green(ed-Up) Products, GREEN MARKETALERT, Jan. 1992, available
in Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database.
173. EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERms, supra note 13, at
35.
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a. Recyclable
The EPA defines a recyclable product as one that "can be
recovered from or otherwise diverted from the solid waste
stream for the purpose of recycling."174 Although some state
regulations and enforcement activities 175 have prompted mar-
keters to remove this claim from their products, 176 "recyclable"
claims were the fastest growing type of environmental claim
from 1990 to 1991. 77 Most of these claims related to the pack-
aging rather than the product itself.178
Surveys reveal that consumers have a relatively good
understanding of the meaning of "recyclable."179 Although con-
sumers may not appreciate the details of the recycling pro-
cess,'8 0 most consumers recognize that a "recyclable" product or
package goes through an additional process, usually at a re-
174. Guidance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and "Recyclable" and the
Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,992,
49,994 (1991). See also Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims,
16 C.F.R. § 260.7(d) (1994) ("A product or package should not be marketed as
recyclable unless it can be collected, separated or otherwise recovered from the
solid waste stream for use in the form of raw materials in the manufacture or
assembly of a new package or product."); Carl Frankel, Review of Corporate La-
belling Strategies, GREEN MARKE:TALERT, Nov. 1991, (on file with the Minnesota
Law Review) (explaining that the National Advertising Review Board of the
Better Business Bureau defines recyclable to mean "the product is transformed
to another useful purpose, through a process that includes human intervention,
and that it is not added to the waste stream once its initial use is completed").
175. See infra notes 335-354 and accompanying text (discussing state regu-
lation and enforcement activities).
176. EVALUATION OF E moN1ENTAL MARMETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
41, 71-102.
177. Id. at 38.
178. Id.
179. See HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 42 (pagination added) (reporting
results of Environmental Research Associates survey that 80% of respondents
define recyclable as "the ability to convert particular materials into another
product"); id. at 9 (citing BRENDA J. CUDE, MARKETING AND ADVERTISING
CLAMS: COMENTS PREPARED FOR THE JULY 1991 FTC PUBLIC HEARINGS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING AND ADVERTISING CLAIS (Cooperative Extension
Service, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991) (noting that in five
out of six reported surveys a majority of respondents understand term
"recycled")).
180. Id. at 10 (citing CUBE, supra note 179, reporting that only eight percent
of respondents knew that glass peanut butter jar was recyclable with or without
label); id. at 35 (pagination added) (citing Roper Organization survey, reporting
that two-thirds of respondents unaware of what happens in recycling
programs).
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cycling facility.181 The most prevalent source of confusion asso-
ciated with the term "recyclable" involves the geographic
availability of recycling facilities. 182  Many claims of re-
cyclability pertain only to technical feasibility and do not dis-
close whether recycling facilities are available in the local
geographic region.' 8 3 This leads to consumer confusion because
consumers believe claims of "recyclable" (as well as "compost-
able" 8 4) mean appropriate facilities are available locally L8 5
even if they are not. Because even qualifying phrases such as
"recyclable where facilities exist" may lead consumers to believe
that such facilities exist locally, both the FTC and EPA recom-
mend a qualifying phrase such as "check to see if recycling facili-
ties exist in your area."
86
b. Recycled
From 1989 to 1992, "recycled" claims constituted slightly
more than ten percent of all environmental claims.' 87 According
to the EPA, "recycled" means that a product or package is made
of pre-consumer or post-consumer materials.' 8 8 The FTC states
that a claim of recycled content applies "only for materials that
have been recovered or otherwise diverted from the solid waste
181. Id. at 9 (citing AUS Consultants survey, reporting that 76% of respon-
dents noted that a product labeled "recyclable" will not automatically be re-
cycled if thrown out with other trash).
182. Id. (citing AUS Consultants survey, reporting that 43% of respondents
thought a product labeled "recyclable" should be recyclable in "all" or "most"
communities); id. at 10 (reporting Good Housekeeping survey, showing that
52% of respondents assumed "recycling" label meant facilities available locally).
183. EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
38, 41; Selling Green, 56 CONSUMER REP. 687, 688 (1991).
184. A product or package is compostable if it "will break down into, or
otherwise become a part of, usable compost (e.g., soil-conditioning material,
mulch) in a safe and timely manner in an appropriate composting program or
facility, or in a home compost pile or device." Guides for the Use of Environ-
mental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(c) (1994).
185. HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 10 (reporting University of Utah study
of environmental claims, which found that 52% of respondents would assume
facilities exist where claim is made).
186. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§ 260.7(d) (1994); EPA Guidance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and "Re-
cyclable" and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56
Fed. Reg. 49,992, 49,998 (1991) ("[Aln example of a qualified claim could be:
'This bottle can be recycled in communities where collection facilities exist.").
187. EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING CLAIMS, supra note 13, at
43.
188. EPA Guidance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and "Recyclable"
and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg.
49,992, 49,994 (1991).
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stream, either during the manufacturing process (pre-con-
sumer), or after consumer use (post-consumer)." 8 9 Other defini-
tions created by certain states limit "recycled" to include only
post-consumer waste.1 90 Most consumers do not consider the
proportion of recycled material in a product or package as the
important consideration, but instead merely believe that "any
recycled content is a positive step."1 91
Consumers appear to understand the general meaning of
"recycled" better than most other green claims.1 92 Although
most do not understand the distinction between pre-consumer
and post-consumer waste,' 93 consumers ironically tend to per-
ceive whether a product or package is recycled based on the rela-
tive content of pre-consumer and post-consumer waste.' 94 For
example, commentators argue that consumers may believe that
a "recycled" product is made from 100% post-consumer waste. 95
In fact, the product may contain less than 100% recycled mate-
ria11 96 and part of that material may be pre-consumer waste. 97
This confusion has prompted several states to adopt uniform
189. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§ 260.7(e) (1994).
190. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17,508.5(e) (West 1994) (defining
"recycled" as "containing at least 10 percent by weight, post-consumer mate-
rial"); GREEN REPORT II, supra note 4, at 8 (recommending that "only post-con-
sumer materials be referred to as 'recycled' materials").
191. EVALUATION OF ENVIRozmENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
18.
192. Id. at 17 (reporting 75% of respondents correctly defined the general
term "recycled," while only 38% correctly defined "recycled plastic"); see also
HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 11 (citing George Washington University sur-
vey, reporting 81% of respondents able to match term "recycled" to its
definition).
193. EVALUATION OF ENvRoNMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
18.
194. HAsTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 45 (summarizing a survey conducted
by AUS Consultants).
195. John Glass, Environmental Marketing Assailed by AGs, BOSTON Bus.
J., Mar. 26, 1990, at 7; Michael Specter, Making Sense of Labeling on Products,
N.Y. Tirms, Dec. 16, 1991, at B1.
196. EPA Guidance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and "Recyclable"
and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg.
49,992, 49,995 (1991); Specter, supra note 195, at B1.
197. Selling Green, supra note 183, at 688-89 (pointing out the dispute over
whether "recycled" labels should be restricted to products containing only post-
consumer waste); Terri Shaw, The Selling of "Green", WASH. PosT, Feb. 28,
1991, at T9, T10.
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definitions 98 and the FTC and EPA to suggest that sellers dis-
close the percentage of recycled content on the label. 199
c. Degradable
"Degradable" means a substance will break down under cer-
tain conditions. 200 "Biodegradable" means that a substance de-
composes by micro-organisms, 201 while "photodegradable"
means that a product degrades when exposed to sunlight.202
Claims of degradability occurred with just slightly less fre-
quency than "recyclable," making degradability one of the most
widely used claims. 20 3
Consumers appear to understand the term "degradable"
better than many terms,20 4 but appear confused about the deg-
radation process. 20 5 Some confusion concerning the degradation
process is understandable. Although technically everything will
eventually degrade,20 6 the problem arises in determining how
quickly and how much a product must degrade to use a label
marked "degradable." Consumer products usually end up in
landfills,20 7 where even items that normally break down rather
198. See infra notes 399-410 and accompanying text (discussing state defini-
tional statutes).
199. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§ 260.7 (1994); EPA Guidance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and "Recycl-
able" and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed.
Reg. 49,992, 49,996 (1991).
200. Shaw, supra note 197, at T9.
201. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 36, at 180-81. Regina Johnson,
An SPI Overview of Degradable Plastics, in PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM ON
DEGRADABLE PLASTICS, THE SOCIETY OF THE PLASTIC INDUSTRY, INC. 6, 9 (1987)
[hereinafter SPI Overview].
202. SPI Overview, supra note 201, at 9; FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra
note 36, at 181-82.
203. EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
41. After a sharp increase, the percentage of new claims has remained rela-
tively constant. Id.
204. Surveys find that approximately 65-70% of respondents correctly pro-
vided a general definition of "degradable." HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 30
(pagination added) (citing CUDE, supra note 179, reporting that 71% of respon-
dents were able to define degradable); Green and Getting Greener, supra note 17
(reporting on Environmental Research Associates survey result that 70% of re-
spondents able to provide definition).
205. HASTA ET AL., supra note 13, at 30 (pagination added) (citing CUDE,
supra note 179).
206. ELKINGTON ET AL., supra note 26, at 50; Wang, supra note 54, at 98.
207. U.S. EPA, PUB. No. EPA 530-S-92-019, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICI-
PAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992 UPDATE, at ES-5 (table ES-2)
(1992) (reporting that 67% (by weight) of municipal solid waste was disposed of
in landfills in 1990).
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easily (such as food and paper) can last for decades. 208 More-
over, to achieve degradability, plastic manufacturers often mod-
ify the composition of the plastic20 9 or use additives such as
cornstarch 210 that allow light or microorganisms to sever the
bonds within the material. Although the additives break down,
the synthetic plastics do not.211 Degradable plastic thus simply
disintegrates into smaller pieces of plastic. 212 Consequently,
scientists are skeptical about using "degradable" to imply that a
product or its packages will actually reduce the solid waste
problem. 213
2. Ozone-Related Claims
Ozone-related claims, such as "CFC-free" or "ozone-friendly"
appeared very rarely, comprising only one percent of all prod-
ucts with environmental claims from 1989 through 1992.214
Ozone-related claims typically imply that the product or pack-
age does not contain substances that will destroy the strato-
208. Items such as cabbages, carrots, and readable newspapers have been
found in landfills 30 years after being buried. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra
note 36, at 275; U.S. EPA, PUB. No. EPA 530-K-92-003, THE CONSumres HAND-
BOOK FOR REDUCING SOLID WASTE 17 (1992) (on file with author); Shaw, supra
note 197, at 10.
209. SPI Overview, supra note 201, at 4; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUB. No. GAO/RCED-88-208, DEGRADABLE PLASTICS: STANDARDS, RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT 10-11 (1988).
210. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 36, at 181; SPI Overview, supra
note 201, at 11.
211. New Study Challenges "Biodegradable" Claims, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5,
1991, at C4 (Late Edition); Glass, supra note 195, at 7.
212. New Study Challenges "Biodegradable" Claims, supra note 211, at C4.
213. U.S. EPA, PUB. No. EPA 530-K-92-003, THE CONSUMIER's HANDBOOK
FOR REDUCING SOLID WASTE 17 (1992) (on file with author); Dianne Dunma-
noski, Shopping to Survival?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1990, at 32.
214. EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
46; Class I Ozone Depleting Substances, 56 Fed. Reg. 2420, 2423 (1994) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82). Claims related to energy use or resource conserva-
tion, including wildlife conservation, constitute another infrequently used
claim. See EVALUATION OF ENViRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13,
at 37 (stating that ozone claims constituted 2.6% of all new environmental
claims for the period from January 1989 through June 1992). One possible
reason for the infrequent use of energy/resource related claims is that the FTC
currently mandates efficiency labels on household appliances. See Rule Con-
cerning Disclosures of Information About Energy Consumption and Water Use
for Certain Home Appliances and Other Products Required Under the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, 16 C.F.R. § 305 (1994). The EPA mandates fuel
efficiency disclosure. Fuel Economy of Motor Vehicles, 40 C.F.R. § 600 (1993).
Studies have found that the labels raise awareness of energy efficiency issues,
but have a negligible effect on purchasing decisions. See, e.g., EVALUATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TEmis, supra note 13, at 33-37, 50.
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spheric ozone layer.215 Only seven percent of respondents in one
survey, however, believed that a product without CFCs was less
damaging to the ozone layer or the atmosphere than a product
with CFCs. 216 Indeed, nearly seventy percent of the respon-
dents did not understand the phrase 'No CFCs."217 This con-
sumer confusion seems understandable, because ozone-related
claims may not involve attributes that are necessarily better for
the environment.
Those who oppose the use of ozone-related claims contend
that a claim such as "CFC-free" does not meaningfully differenti-
ate products.218 Apparently these critics fear that consumers
will mistakenly believe a product has been altered when it has
not.219 For example, CFCs have been banned in aerosol prod-
ucts since 1978 and banned in most other products more re-
cently.220 Consequently, a claim that a product is "CFC-free" or
"ozone-friendly" may indicate nothing more than a claim that
the manufacturer has complied with the law.221 In addition,
these critics believe that sellers may mislead consumers into be-
lieving that by replacing the ozone-depleting substance, the
product has a positive environmental benefit. Many manufac-
turers, however, have replaced CFC propellants in aerosol prod-
ucts with butane or propane, which contribute to smog.222
Because there is no satisfactory method of comparing the social
costs of smog to those related to damage of the ozone layer, the
215. FTC Green Marketing Action, GREEN MAmETALERT, July 1993, avail-
able in Westlaw, PTS-Promt Database (product containing ozone-depleting
chemicals was labeled as "environmentally friendly" and containing "no
CFC's"); ELKINGTON ET AL., supra note 26, at 224.
216. HASTAK ET. AL., supra note 13 (citing CUDE, supra note 179).
217. Id.
218. See Hearings on Environmental Marketing Issues Before the Federal
Trade Commission 45-46 (1991) (testimony of Michael Alcamo, New York City
Department of Consumer Affairs, noting that environmentally harmful prod-
ucts may claim to have no CFCs, which misleads consumers).
219. Fierman, supra note 29, at 96.
220. Id.; Shaw, supra note 197, at 10; Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 40
C.F.R. § 82 (1994) (discussing ozone depletion and the Montreal Protocol).
221. Claims that a product is ozone-friendly when, in fact, it contains ozone-
depleting chemicals have been found deceptive. See infra notes 323-326 and
accompanying text (discussing Zipatone).
222. Fierman, supra note 29, at 96; Environmental Labeling of Consumer
Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990) (testi-
mony of Sen. Lieberman).
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net environmental impact of replacing ozone-depleting sub-
stances remains unclear.223
c. General Environmental Claims
Claims such as "environmentally safe," "environmentally
friendly," or "green" are virtually devoid of content. Every prod-
uct has some deleterious environmental impact arising from
either the resources used in its manufacture or its transporta-
tion to market.224 Because these terms have no independent
meaning, the FTC225 and a Task Force of State Attorneys Gen-
eral226 have recommended that sellers avoid using broad envi-
ronmental claims or at least qualify these terms to specifically
explain the environmental benefits of the product. The use of
general environmental claims increased more than five-fold
from 1989 to 1990 and then declined slightly until the first half
of 1992.227 Not surprisingly, fewer than half of consumers sur-
veyed could provide an acceptable definition of "environmentally
friendly" or "environmentally safe,"228 and many questioned the
validity of such claims.229
The preceding discussion illustrates existing consumer un-
certainty about the meaning of terms commonly used in environ-
mental advertising. This uncertainty has led to consumer
mistrust of certain green claims. Surveys find that from forty-
two percent to fifty-six percent of consumers dismiss environ-
mental claims as "mere gimmickry" or believe that brands ad-
vertised as environmentally benign are no better for the
environment.230 One survey reveals that some environmental
223. "Life-cycle" analysis presents one option of making such comparisons.
However, the life-cycle analysis is unsatisfactory because, in part, it is laden
with value judgments. See supra notes 50-105 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 1.
225. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7 (1994).
226. GREEN REPORT II, supra note 4.
227. EVALUATION OF EvmoNmENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
43.
228. HAsrAK ET AL., supra note 13 (reporting on Environmental Research
Associates survey indicating that 48% of survey respondents knew "environ-
mentally friendly" was something that did not harm environment); id. (citing
CUBE, supra note 179).
229. EVALUATION OF ENVRONMETrAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 13, at
22 (citing a spring 1991 survey by Angus Reid Group, Golin Harris Communica-
tions and Environomics); Judann Dagnoli, Consciously Green, ADVERTISING
AGE, Sept. 16, 1991, at 14.
230. Chase & Smith, supra note 14, at S-2, S-4 (52% of respondents paying
little attention to environmental labels). Claims that a product or package is
"recycled" may create uncertainty for consumers. Dagnoli, supra note 29, at 91
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labels instill more confidence than others. Claims of "recyclable"
and "recycled" generated the most confidence.231 In contrast,
nearly half of the respondents were confused by "environmen-
tally friendly."232 Some anecdotal evidence further indicates
that consumers may reduce their purchases of environmentally
benign products due to their confusion or skepticism. 233 This ev-
idence notwithstanding, many market analysts predict that en-
vironmentally-related products will continue to perform well.23 4
Furthermore, consumer mistrust and doubt are higher
when the claim conveys less useful information. 23 5 Consumer
understanding is highest for terms such as "recycled" and "re-
cyclable," where the major source of deception appears to sur-
round only the percentage of recycled content and the market
availability of recycling facilities. 236 For these two terms, the
FTC Guidelines appear to effectively address consumer confu-
sion by encouraging that claims state the percentage of recycled
material and contain disclaimers concerning the availability of
recycling facilities. 237 Moreover, as consumers become more so-
phisticated, they will better understand technical information.
In contrast, consumers do not seem to trust or understand
claims such as "environmentally friendly" or "CFC Free."238
Consumers appropriately prefer specific information to broad
claims. Consumer uncertainty concerning ozone-related claims,
for example, perfectly correlates with the scientific uncertainty
concerning the environmental benefits of ozone-related claims
(47% dismiss environmental claims as "mere gimmickry"); Fierman, supra note
29, at 91 (47% dismiss environmental claims as "mere gimmickry"); HASTAK ET
AL., supra note 13, at 10 (quoting a University of Utah study of environmental
claims: "Almost half (49%) agreed that brands with environmental claims were
no better for the environment than other brands.").
231. HASTAK ET AL., supra note 13 (citing Environmental Research Associ-
ates survey).
232. Id. at 9.
233. See EVALUATION OF ENviRoNmENTAL MARKETING TERMs, supra note 13,
at v.
234. Id.; see also Chase & Smith, supra note 14, at S-2, S-4 ("Concern for the
environment is moving at glacierlike speed into the mainstream, which means
less noise about it but greater impact on buying decisions.").
235. See supra notes 228-234 and accompanying text (discussing consumer
reactions to general environmental claims).
236. See supra notes 182-186, 192-197 and accompanying text (discussing
consumer confusion about recycled and recyclable products).
237. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R.
§ 260 (1994).
238. See supra notes 224-230 and accompanying text (discussing general en-
vironmental claims).
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and the increased cost of processing the technical information
associated with ozone-related claims. 239
According to the EOI model, consumer mistrust and uncer-
tainty does not necessarily reveal a poorly functioning market
for information. Indeed, mistrust motivates consumer search
and sophistication, elements necessary for an efficient mar-
ket.240 Because government regulation can not eliminate decep-
tive advertising entirely, some level of deception and consumer
doubt remains inevitable. Moreover, scientific uncertainty con-
cerning the environmental impact of consumer products will
necessarily translate into consumer decision making.241 If ex-
perts and legislators cannot reach a consensus concerning "ap-
propriate" environmental attributes, then we should expect
uncertainty in the consumer market as well.
C. THE EcoNoMIcs OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: THIRD
PARTY EVALUATIONS
Consumer mistrust creates a serious problem for advertis-
ers. A legitimate, truthful advertiser must convey that its envi-
ronmental claim is true. Consumers may believe the truth of a
green claim because of the seller's reputation for honesty, or
market forces may operate to assure honest advertising by the
seller.242 In many cases, however, sufficiently guaranteeing the
truthfulness of an environmental claim may require additional
information, and hence cost more.
When consumers doubt a seller's claim,243 a third-party
evaluation or certification may correct the high cost of guaran-
teeing truthfulness in the market of information.244 Third-party
evaluations may have significant advantages over consumer
239. See supra notes 214-223 and accompanying text (discussing scientific
uncertainty about ozone-related claims).
240. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text (discussing consumer
search).
241. J. HowARD BEALES & TIMOTHY J. MuPis, STATE AND FEDERAL REGULA-
TION OF NATIONAL ADVERTISING (1993).
242. Some of these market forces are discussed in the next subsection. See
infra part llI.D. See also PoSNER, supra note 134, at 4-7; Benjamin Klein &
Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Perform-
ance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
243. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text (discussing high cost of
search causing consumer uncertainty).
244. The market for third party evaluations is analyzed in Thomas L.
Eovaldi, The Market for Consumer Product Evaluations: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 79 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 1235 (1985). The theoretical analysis in this sec-
tion relies heavily on Professor Eovaldi's analysis.
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search and seller provision of information. Third parties can
spread the cost of producing evaluations among large numbers
of consumers, thereby lowering their cost to individual purchas-
ers. In addition, large scale testing organizations can take ad-
vantage of returns to scale in the cost of testing.245 Most
importantly, third-party evaluators "have little incentive to dis-
tort the facts or steer the consumer to a particular product."246
In essence, the seller relies upon the reputation of the third-
party evaluator to convey the veracity of its claim.
EOI would predict that appropriate markets should contain
successful third-party evaluation schemes and, in fact, several
such schemes exist to evaluate product qualities. 247 For exam-
ple, Consumers Union performs a variety of safety and product
quality tests on a range of consumer products and publishes the
results in its monthly magazine Consumer Reports.24 s Under-
245. Id.; see also Beales et al., supra note 136, at 505, 515 (discussing "ex-
pert" provision of information).
246. Howard Beales et al., Consumer Search and Public Policy, 8 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 11, 16 (1981).
247. Not all of the third-party certification schemes have been successful. In
1989, the American Heart Association ("AHA") unveiled plans to begin a
Heartguide seal for foods comparatively low in fats, cholesterol, and sodium.
Marian Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1989, at C4. A primary con-
cern with the Heartguide seal was that it could be attached to products that
were comparatively healthy, but still promoted heart disease. See Mark Bloom,
The Flap Over Food Labelling: FDA Puts Heart Association's Seal of Approval
in Jeopardy, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1989, at El. Trade associations and public
interest groups objected to the label's cost, possibly prohibitive for small compa-
nies, and to the AHA's refusal to disclose its evaluation criteria. Carole
Sugarman, What's the Price of Approval? Companies Hesitate Over Cost of
HeartGuide Seal, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1989, at El. Eventually, the AHA suc-
cumbed to concerted pressure from the FDA and other groups and terminated
the project. Natalie Angier, Heart Association Cancels its Program to Rate
Foods, N.Y. TmiEs, Apr. 3, 1990, at Al; Janet Meyers, HeartGuide Legacy: FDA
May Shoot Down Other Seal Programs, ADVERTISING AGE, May 2, 1990, at 60.
248. Consumer Reports ranks as the single most important source of infor-
mation about product quality. See David J. Currey, Measuring Price and Qual-
ity Competition Among Conglomerates: Methodology and an Application to the
Major Appliance Industry, 10 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 400, 401 (1983) (citing
a survey of 1247 households, conducted by National Family Opinion, Inc); Ross
D. Petty, Advertising and the First Amendment: A Practical Test for Distin-
guishing Commercial Speech from Fully Protected Speech, 12 J. PUB. PoL'y &
MAKTING 170, 175 (1993) (noting that consumers may be influenced to
purchase products that are rated by Consumer Reports rather than those that
are not); Robert DeMaris, Al Ries and Jack Trout's Positioning: The Battle for
Your Mind, 56 J. MARKETING 122 (1992) (book review) ("Consumers often read
Consumer Reports and perceive themselves as experts."); see also NORMAN I.
SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS UNION (1983) (dis-
cussing Consumers Union's influence on consumers). But see E. Scott Maynes,
Salute and Critique: Remarks on Ratchford and Gupta's Analysis of Price-
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writers Laboratories, organized by the insurance industry,
now provides the universally accepted safety certification for
electrical products. 2 49 Both the American Medical Associa-
tion250 and the American Dental Association 51 approve various
consumer products such as over-the-counter medical and dental
products.
Seller advertising of a third-party seal of approval or certifi-
cation strongly influences consumer perception of a firm's trust-
worthiness because consumers find messages accompanied by
third-party evaluations more trustworthy.252 In the green mar-
ket, third-party evaluations would increase consumer confidence
concerning a seller's environmental claims.253 Not surprisingly,
two private environmental certification systems have emerged
in this country.254
Green Seal is a non-profit organization that has the finan-
cial support of several major environmental groups, including
Quality Relations, 15 J. CONSUMER PoiY 83, 85 (1992) (reporting that in-
dependent sources of information, like Consumer Reports, were rarely consid-
ered by consumers).
249. See William P. Barrett, Testing for Money, FORBES, July 6, 1992, at 96;
Green Seal, UL Join to Monitor Claims, DiscouTrr STORE NEWS, Aug. 19, 1991,
at 2; Heating and Cooling, DO-IT-YOURSELF-RErMLING, May 1994, at 168; Plas-
tics and Composites, MAcHINE DESIGN, Nov. 1989, at 106; The Public Gives UL
its Seal of Approval, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1965, at 92; The Quality Race: Pres-
sures from Internationally Competitive OEMs are Prodding Testing Laborato-
ries and Test Equipment Suppliers to Higher Levels of Performance, APPLIANCE,
Dec. 1993, at 27; Laurie A. Shuster, The Environment: How the Hardware In-
dustry Measures Up, HARDWARE AGE, Jan. 1993, at 41.
250. Priscilla A. LaBarbera, Overcoming a No-Reputation Liability Through
Documentation and Advertising Regulation, 19 J. MRETING RES. 223, 227
(1982) (noting that consumers responded favorably to AMA approval of
bandages).
251. David B. Montgomery & J. Scott Armstrong, Brand Trial After a Credi-
bility Change, 10 J. ADvERTISING RES., Oct. 1970, at 26 (noting that ADA ap-
proval increased the market share of Crest toothpaste from 12% to 35%).
252. Thomas L. Parkinson, The Role of Seals and Certifications of Approval
in Consumer Decision-Making, 9 J. CONSIMER AFF. 1, 7-10 (1975); see also
supra notes 248-251 and the studies cited therein. For studies questioning the
impact of seals of approval, see Richard F. Beltramini & Edwin R. Stafford,
Comprehension and Perceived Believability of Seals of Approval Information in
Advertising, 22 J. ADVERTISING 3 (1993).
253. HASTAxK r AL., supra note 13, at 56 (pagination added) (citing J. Walter
Thompson, JWT Greenwatch (Spring/Summer 1991)); Gray-Lee et al., supra
note 128, at 158-59; Steve Lustgarden, Organics Take Root, VEGETARIAN TIMES,
June 1993, at 72. ("Once there's clarity about what the standards are and eve-
rybody has to abide by certification procedures, it will boost consumer confi-
dence in product quality .. ").
254. Two articles focus on the legal and market implications of these private
green certifiers. Grodsky, supra note 10; O'Reilly, supra note 10.
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the Environmental Defense Fund.255 Green Seal has contracted
with Underwriters Laboratories to test a product's environmen-
tal attributes.256 Green Seal does not simply verify an adver-
tiser's environmental claims; rather, it awards a seal to products
that meet threshold standards for multiple attributes.257
Scientific Certification Systems, Inc., formerly Green
Cross, 2 58 initiated an environmental labeling program in
1989.259 Scientific Certification provides two levels of certifica-
tion. The first level checks the accuracy of specific environmen-
tal claims made by manufacturers. 260 The second level, a
modified life-cycle inventory analysis, provides data comparing
the environmental impact of the product to that of its competi-
tors at various stages in the product's life.2 61 Scientific Cer-
tification reports its results in a bar chart that it calls an
"Environmental Report Card."262
Scientific Certification and Green Seal actively compete
against each other. The Environmental Defense Fund has
charged that manufacturers use the Scientific Certification label
in "a manner likely to mislead or confuse consumers." 263 The
president of Scientific Certification countered that these charges
merely attempted to eliminate Green Seal's competition, noting
that two members of Green Seal's board of directors occupied
influential positions in the Environmental Defense Fund.2 64
Commentators disagree concerning the effect of this certification
competition. One commentator suggests that competitive pres-
sures in the marketplace could prompt the certifiers to relax
255. Martha M. Hamilton, Giving the Green Stamp of Approval: Two
Groups Compete to Label Environmentally Friendly Products, WASH. POST, Oct.
3, 1991, at Bl; GREEN SEAL, INC., GREEN SEAL ANNOUNCES INITIAL PRODUCT
CATEGORIES TO BE TESTED FOR NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING PROGRAM 1
(1990).
256. Hamilton, supra note 255, at Bll.
257. Randolph B. Smith, Group to Award Environmental Seals of Approval,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 1990, at B4.
258. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 208-09.
259. SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS, INC., SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION
SYSTEM'S ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION PROGRAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS 1 (1992).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2.
262. See id.
263. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 209 (citing R. JUSTIN SMITH & RICHARD DEN-
ISON, ENVIRO NMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, AT CROSS PURPOSES? A CRITICAL EXAMi-
NATION OF GREEN CROSS'S ENVIRONMENTAL RECORDS 39 (1991)).
264. Id. at 209 (citing GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION Co., REVIEW OF THE
GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (1991)).
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standards to attract business. 265 Conversely, another author ar-
gues that "competition is very much desired" because such com-
petition will force the certifier to respond to its clients' needs at
the lowest cost.266
With Scientific Certification and Green Seal, "competition"
may merely indicate market segmentation. Each certification
scheme has its own particular advantages. For example, for
consumers who defer to environmental groups' judgment con-
cerning environmental policy, a statement from Green Seal will
provide important information. In fact, the mere existence of
the seal on the product conveys useful information, because it
indicates that the product has been reviewed. For other con-
sumers who do not defer to the judgment of environmental activ-
ists, or who even distrust environmental organizations, the
additional information conveyed by Scientific Certification's En-
vironmental Report Card may promote a more informed choice.
This is not to say that the two organizations will continue to
coexist. On the one hand, consumers may never understand the
tradeoffs implicit in Scientific Certification's Environmental Re-
port Card. On the other hand, the simple seal may not provide
sufficient information to make Green Seal viable. Ultimately,
whether either or both of these certification schemes survives
depends on decisions made in the market for environmental in-
formation. The market will also provide other sources of infor-
mation. These market forces are discussed in the next section.
D. THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION:
MARKET SIGNALS
Many commentators argue that consumer uncertainty will
prevent the market for environmentally benign products from
functioning efficiently.267 This analysis, however, focuses solely
on the behavior of individual consumers rather than the market
as a whole; accordingly, if any consumer is uncertain, the mar-
ket has failed. Looking more broadly at the market, instead of
individual consumers, indicates that several factors will protect
uninformed consumers and create an incentive for sellers to pro-
vide truthful green claims.268
265. Id. at 209-13.
266. O'Reilly, supra note 10, at 203.
267. See supra note 12 (explaining efficient market).
268. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 27 U. PA. L. Rav. 630,
635 (1979) (stating that the conventional approach "incorrectly focuses on indi-
viduals rather than on the markets in which they purchase.").
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EOI suggests that a company's reputation for truthfulness
allows consumers to evaluate efficiently that company's green
claims.2 6 9 Indeed, consumers find green claims of some compa-
nies more reliable than the same claims made by others because
of the company's reputation for truthfulness. 270 High levels of
advertising thus reliably signal to consumers that the product
displays the desired attribute,2 7 1 and therefore the mere pres-
ence of advertising is a useful market signal.272 Recognizing the
importance of their reputational asset, firms invest heavily in
advertising to create and preserve their environmental
reputations.2 73
National environmental groups have, on occasion, sold their
reputation to corporations that are attempting to make their
corporate images more "green." For example, to defuse contro-
versy concerning its polystyrene packaging, McDonald's began
working with the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") in the
269. POSNER, supra note 242, at 4-7; Klein & Leffler, supra note 242, at 629-
33. POSNER, supra note 134, at 4-7.
270. Caren Arnstein, How Companies Can Rebuild Credibility and Public
Trust, PuB. REL. J., Apr. 1994, at 28 (discussing the plight of three companies
trying to overcome difficult environmental situations); Environmentalism a
"Religion," Says Lindheim, PR SERVICES, Feb. 1993, at 20 (stating that con-
snmer trust of petrochemical companies has declined over the past decade); C.J.
Silas, The Environmental: Playing to Win, PuB. REL. J., Jan. 1990, at 10 ("[Tlhe
American people [do not] trust industry to be responsible with our country's air,
water, and land.").
271. Firms that expend resources to enhance their reputation have more to
lose if they are caught cheating. In other words, there is a positive relationship
between "advertising intensity and the extent of quality that is costly to deter-
mine prepurchase." Klein & Leffler, supra note 242, at 631.
272. Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information Once More, in IssUEs IN AD.
VERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION, supra note 128, at 133.
273. Paul Abrahams, Clouds of Suspicion - Chemicals Must Fight to Clear
Their Name, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 1992, at IV (stating that the chemical
industry is trying to improve its image by encouraging individual companies to
clean up their environmental performance); Frank Buckingham, Spray Pat-
terns Are Changing, IMPLEMENT & TRACTOR, Feb. 1989, at 23 ("The Alliance for
a Clean Rural Environment (ACRE) is another effort of the chemical industry to
improve its image.. . ."); Kevin Maney, More Firms Go Green, U.S.A. TODAY,
Mar. 21, 1991, at 1B (reporting that U.S. Sprint and other companies attempted
to spruce up their environmental image); Profiles of Top Environmental PR
Firms, PR SERVICES, Feb. 1994, at 30 (stating that environmental PR firms
help corporate America clean up its environmental image); Peter Stisser, A
Deeper Shade of Green, AM. DEMOGRAPMCS, Mar. 1994, at 24 ("Making a sub-
stantial long-term commitment to the environment can dramatically improve
the public's attitudes toward your business."); Amy Wallace, Dolphin-Safe Tuna
Fishing is Aim of Bumble Bee Study, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1991, at Dl (stating
that encouraging dolphin-safe tuna fishing could improve the tarnished reputa-
tion of the industry).
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summer of 1990 to improve its environmental reputation.274 As
a result, McDonald's announced plans to abandon the polysty-
rene clam shell in November 1990, and switch to plastic-coated-
paper "quilt wrap" for sandwiches and plastic-film-coated card-
board for hot beverages.275 Although the plan initially received
negative publicity,276 the arrangement allows McDonald's to
profit from its environmental investment. Because the EDF will
undoubtedly take a great deal of care in selling its "approval" to
prevent potential damage to its reputation, consumers can be
assured that McDonald's has taken significant strides to "green"
its corporate behavior.
Another important factor ensuring truthful advertising
claims is that environmental advertising generally exists with
products sold in mass consumer transactions. Mass transac-
tions make sellers dependent on repeat purchases. 277 In addi-
tion, sellers have an additional incentive to provide truthful
information to the marketplace because they cannot conve-
niently learn the characteristics of individual consumers.278
A well functioning market will emerge when a critical mass
of sophisticated consumers279 develops to force the firm, through
its purchasing decisions, to supply products with desired envi-
ronmental attributes and make truthful green claims about
their products. Continued consumer demand and more informa-
tion concerning the validity of green claims will increase the
number of sophisticated consumers, suggesting that the green
market will function efficiently. Consumer surveys and sales
data reveal that consumers specifically shop for environmental
products. 28 0 Mass media attention increases the amount of in-
formation to consumers and facilitates useful comparisons.
Moreover, environmental and consumer groups will maintain a
watchful eye over environmental claims concerning consumer
products.
274. See Phyllis Berman, McDonald's Caves In, FORBES, Feb. 4, 1991, at 73;
Hume, supra note 33, at 32; see also supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text
(describing the McDonald's move away from polystyrene packaging).
275. Hume, supra note 33, at 32.
276. Id.
277. Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra note 139, at 730.
278. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 268, at 663-65.
279. "Sophisticated consumers," according to Schwartz and Wilde, are those
who engage in a moderate or high level of search. Id. at 637. Sophisticated
consumers must obtain sufficient information to evaluate the truthfulness of
product claims. Id.
280. See supra notes 13-23 (discussing survey evidence of consumers' prefer-
ence for green attributes).
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Consumer uncertainty in the market for environmental in-
formation does not evidence market failure; rather, it is consis-
tent with the notion that information is a costly, i.e., economic,
good. In fact, several factors indicate that the market has per-
formed admirably. Sellers, by supplying environmental infor-
mation about their products through advertising, are
responding to consumer demand for environmental attributes.
Consumers can now access a number of media sources to edu-
cate themselves concerning environmental policy and specific
advertising claims made by sellers. 281 Market forces create an
incentive for the seller to provide truthful information because
mass transactions make the seller dependent on repeat
purchases. In addition, a critical mass of sophisticated consum-
ers will direct sellers to provide products with desired environ-
mental attributes. If the reliability of a green claim does become
suspect, the seller may seek a certification from a third-party,
such as Green Seal or Scientific Certification Systems, verifying
the claim. These certifiers also independently supply useful in-
formation through either Environmental Report Cards or Seals
of Approval.
IV. REGULATING GREEN CLAIMS
Environmental advertising regulations have followed a
number of different models. Traditionally, regulation in the
United States has focused on ensuring that advertising and
marketing claims are truthful. Some states and foreign coun-
tries, however, have adopted statutes designed to regulate con-
sumer information to accomplish environmental policy goals.
These statutes are typically minimum content regulations or
complex labelling statutes that govern when, and sometimes
how, a seller may advertise environmental attributes. This Part
explores these differing regulatory approaches.
A. REGULATION OF DECEPTION
1. Federal Regulation of Green Claims: The Role of the
Federal Trade Commission
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA")28 2
gives the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission")
281. This Article and the sources cited herein are examples of the available
media sources.
282. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
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jurisdiction over advertising and labelling.28 3 Section 5 of the
FTCA prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affect-
ing commerce."284 The FTC has interpreted section 5 to prevent
unfair,28 5  deceptive, 286  or unsubstantiated 287  advertising
283. Congress established the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 to enforce
antitrust policy. The original language of the statute prohibited only "unfair
methods of competition." Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 45(a)(1), 38 Stat. 717,
719 (1914). Although the Commission interpreted this language as preventing
untruthful advertising, FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919), the courts were
reluctant to adopt such an interpretation. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643,
649 (1931). However, in 1938, Congress amended § 5 of the FTCA to outlaw
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447,
§ 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(1982)). The amend-
ment expanded the FTC's authority to include false advertising and business
practices. Id. at 114. Thus, the authority of the Commission to take actions to
prevent false advertising is no longer in doubt.
284. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988). Section 12 of the FTCA specifically prohib-
its false advertising likely to induce the purchase of food, drugs, devices or cos-
metics. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1988). If an advertisement violates § 12 it also
violates § 5. Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 770, 873-74 (1977), aff'd, 605
F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Simeon Management
Corp., 87 F.T.C. 1184, 1229 (1976), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978).
285. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988). At times the Commission has labeled con-
duct as either "unfair" or "deceptive." Usually, however, the Commission de-
scribes conduct as "unfair or deceptive," making no distinction between these
terms. See, e.g., Stihl, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 840, 843 (1983) (complaint alleged adver-
tising practices constituted unfair and deceptive acts); FTC v. Communidyne,
Inc., No. 93-C-6043, 1993 WL 558754 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1993) (complaint alleged
that defendant's false claims regarding accuracy of its breathalyzers was an
unfair and deceptive act).
The FTC has determined that unfairness exists where a form of advertising
creates or takes advantage of obstacles to free consumer choice. Letter from
FTC Commissioners to Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Senate Consumer Subcom-
mittee, and John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Consumer
Subcommittee (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 156, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 37 (1983). The ban on unfair competition prevents anticompeti-
tive behavior, including the withholding of important information, and helps to
preserve a variety of marketplace options for consumers. Id. at 37-38.
The definition of "unfairness" has undergone some changes. In 1964, the
Commission suggested a three-factor test:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).
Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408: Unfair or De-
ceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964). The United States
Supreme Court cited the test in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,
244 n.5 (1972).
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claims. Most illegal environmental claims are either deceptive,
unsubstantiated, or both.28 8
Congress chose not to define "deceptive,"28 9 leaving this
task to the FTC and federal courts.290 As a result, the definition
of deception has evolved and generated considerable contro-
In 1978, the Commission backed off from its emphasis on the ethical impli-
cations of the practice and recharacterized the test as involving two parts:
(1) Whether the acts or practices result in substantial harm to con-
sumers. In making this determination both the economic and social
benefits and losses flowing from the challenged conduct must be as-
sessed, and
(2) Whether the challenged conduct offends public policy.
Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, Statement of Basis and Pur-
pose, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,992, 24,000-01 (1978).
Although the term "unfairness [does] not admit of precise definition," FTC
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931), some commentators attempt to find
some of the "golden threads" binding the cases. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNFAIRNESS:
VIEWS ON UNFAIR ACTS AND PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT (Comm. Print 1980); Richard Craswell, The Identification of
Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981 Wis. L. REv.
107; Charles Shafer, Developing Rational Standards for an Advertising Sub-
stantiation Policy, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 18-23 (1986).
286. See, e.g., In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984); see infra
notes 295-296 and accompanying text (citing Cliffdale).
287. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972); Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104
F.T.C. 648 (1984).
288. Although it is clear that an advertisement or label involving an envi-
ronmental claim may be "unfair" as that term is defined by the FTC, most en-
forcement actions focus on the alleged deceptiveness due to the vagueness and
misleading nature of the claims. See infra notes 289-334 and accompanying
text (discussing cases that deal with claims of deceptive advertising).
289. Although some statutory definitions are provided in the FTCA, 15
U.S.C. § 55 (1988), these definitions do not apply to any action commenced
under § 5. See, e.g., Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.
1942).
James C. Miller, Ill, former chairman of the FTC, unsuccessfully lobbied
Congress to amend § 5 to include a definition of a "deceptive" trade act. See
FTC's Authority over Deceptive Advertising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for
Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-9 (1982).
290. According to the Supreme Court:
[The FTCA] necessarily gives the Commission an influential role in in-
terpreting § 5 and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising
out of unprecedented situations. Moreover, as an administrative
agency which deals continually with cases in the area, the Commission
is often in a better position than are courts to determine when a prac-
tice is "deceptive" within the meaning of the Act. This Court has fre-
quently stated that the commission's judgement is to be given great
weight by reviewing courts. This admonition is especially true with
respect to allegedly deceptive advertising since the finding of a § 5 vio-
lation in this field rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic
judgment.
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versy.2 91 To provide more certainty and guidance concerning
the meaning of deception, the FTC adopted a deception policy
("Deception Policy")292 to "synthesize the most important princi-
FTC v. Colgate - Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (footnote omitted);
for other cases explicitly giving broad discretion to the Commission's determi-
nations regarding deception, see also FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419,
428 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946); Simeon Man-
agement Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 1978); Fedders Corp. v.
FTC, 529 F.2d. 1398, 1401-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 414
U.S. 1112 (1973).
291. A number of articles have discussed the appropriate definition of "de-
ceptive." See, e.g., Patricia P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Decep-
tion: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 849 (1984); Richard Craswell,
Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1985); Richard Cras-
well, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 549 (1991); Jake E. Karns, The Federal Trade Commission's Evolv-
ing Deception Policy, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 399 (1988); Ivan L. Preston, The Defi-
nition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other Commercial Speech, 39 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1035 (1990) [hereinafter Preston, Definition of Deceptiveness]; Ivan
L. Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Identification of Implications as
Constituting Deceptive Advertising, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243 (1989) [hereinafter
Preston, FTC's Identification]; Ivan L. Preston & Jef I. Richards, Consumer
Miscomprehension and Deceptive Advertising: A Response to Professor Cras-
well, 68 B.U. L. REv. 431 (1988); Roger E. Schechter, The Death of the Gullible
Consumer: Towards a More Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989
U. ILL. L. REv. 571; E. Thomas Sullivan & Brian A. Marks, The FTC's Deceptive
Advertising Policy: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 64 OR. L. REV. (1986).
Originally, Congress intended that the FTCA extend beyond then-existing com-
mon law consumer protection principles, deemed ineffective, by granting the
Commission broad powers to protect consumers. Courts soon removed the prin-
ciple of caveat emptor from FTC law. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S.
112, 116 (1937). Courts recognized that an act need not constitute fraud to es-
tablish deception under the FTCA. D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th
Cir. 1942). Decisions in the 1930s and 1940s encouraged the Commission to
define "deception" broadly. BEAT s & MuRIs, supra note 10, at 21-22. By the
1960s, critics charged the Commission with defining deception too broadly and
criticized its pursuit of trivial cases, while ignoring major abuses. Id. at 22-23.
The Commission went to the other extreme in the late 1970s when it proposed
regulation of advertising aimed at children. The FTC As National Nanny,
WASH. PoST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22. The FTC narrowed the definition during the
Reagan Administration. The FTC proposed that an act should be deceptive
only if it was likely to mislead reasonable consumers. Bailey & Pertschuk,
supra, at 851-55; Schechter, supra, at 576-77.
292. The Commission's 1983 Policy Statement on Deception ("Deception Pol-
icy Statement") may be found at 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,911 (Oct. 21,
1983); 45 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1137, at 689 (Oct. 27, 1983); and
appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174-84 (1984).
The Deception Policy has a rather tortured history. After rejecting Chair-
man Miller's definitional amendment to § 5, the House Committee on Com-
merce asked the Commission to prepare a statement detailing its deception
enforcement policy. 4 Trade Reg. Rep., supra, at 91 20,911. In October 1983,
Miller provided a statement that became known as the 1983 Policy Statement
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ples of general applicability."293 According to the Deception Pol-
icy, "the Commission will find deception if there is a
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the con-
sumer's detriment."294
The Commission first applied the Deception Policy in In re
Cliffdale Associates.295 Cliffdale involved a mail-order firm
claiming that a device known as the "Ball-Matic Gas Saver
Valve" would increase consumers' gas mileage substantially.
The Commission charged that Cliffdale did not have a reason-
able basis to substantiate its scientific test claims.296 Chairman
Miller, writing for a majority of the Commission, applied the
three-part test ("FTC Test") established in the Deception Policy
Statement to find the advertisement deceptive.
on Deception. Id. The Committee rejected the Deception Policy Statement as a
rehash of the deception standard that Congress refused to codify. Id. Despite
congressional objections, however, the deception definition in the Deception Pol-
icy Statement became the cornerstone of future Commission deception enforce-
ment policies. Id.
293. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, $ 20,911. Chairman
Miller believed the Deception Policy Statement was merely an accurate articu-
lation of the standard established by case law. Karns, supra note 291, at 409.
However, the Deception Policy Statement appears to have narrowed the en-
forcement policy and espoused a free market policy by departing from the tradi-
tional "tendency or capacity to deceive" test. Id. at 412-13.
294. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, 9 20,912. The test has
been sharply criticized, Bailey & Pertschuk, supra note 291, at 851 (arguing
that the test upset 50 years of "essentially consistent" jurisprudence and com-
promises states' ability to enforce state deception laws), but has been repeat-
edly affirmed by the FTC: Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313, 360-62 (1986);
International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1055 (1984). Courts have also af-
firmed the test. Southwest Sunsites, 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 1431
(9th Cir. 1986).
295. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984). The FTC does not engage in full-scale monitor-
ing of print or television advertising. Instead, the FTC investigates advertising
practices based on letters from consumers or businesses, inquiries from Con-
gress, and advice from consumer protection advocates. See FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 3, 17 (1987). In
cases where the FTC has assumed jurisdiction and issued a complaint pursuant
to 16 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1994), the respondent has 30 days to file an answer. Id.
§ 3.12(a). If the respondent does not contest the allegations in the complaint, he
or she waives the right to a hearing. Id. § 3.12(c). The FTC then enters a con-
sent agreement. Id. § 3.25. Likewise, a failure to file an answer results in a
default judgment. Id. § 3.12(c). Should the respondent later contest the
charges, an administrative law judge ("AW") hears the case. Id. An appeal
from the AU's decision is heard by the full Commission which may affirm, re-
verse, or modify the order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(c) (1988). Finally, respondents
who fail to comply with an order of the full Commission are subject to civil
contempt proceedings in federal district court. Id. § 45(1).
296. 103 F.T.C. at 112.
298
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The first element of the FTC Test requires that a represen-
tation, omission, or practice will likely mislead the consumer.297
Actual deception is not necessary.298 FTC administrative judges
will find the claim deceptive even when the consumer discovers
the truth about an advertisement before purchasing the product.
In such a case, the claim still constitutes deceptive advertising
because only the deceptiveness of the claim, not actual decep-
tion, is relevant.299
A deceptive claim may arise expressly300 or impliedly.30 1
Express claims "speak for themselves." Extrinsic evidence, such
as surveys or expert testimony, may be used to interpret implied
claims.302 The content or existence of an implied claim will be
determined by evaluating the contents of the advertisement and
the circumstances surrounding it.303 The omission of material
information may also create a misleading claim.30 4
Traditionally, deceptive advertising arises when the adver-
tiser knows that its claims about a product are false. The Com-
mission, however, will find that an advertiser violates the FTCA
297. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, TT 20,911-12
298. Id. $ 20,912; see also American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d
681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that capacity to deceive may be found without
evidence of actual deception); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212,
214 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding proof of actual deception unnecessary).
299. "[I]t is unfair to make an initial contact or impression through a false or
misleading representation, even though before purchase the consumer is pro-
vided with the true facts." Chrysler Corp., 87 F.T.C. 719, 739 (1976), modified
on other grounds, 90 F.T.C. 606 (1977); see also Preston, Definition of Deceptive-
ness, supra note 291, at 1047.
300. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, 20,911 n.4.
301. Id.; see also Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (2d Cir.)
(holding claim that air conditioners are unique in having reserve cooling power
deceptive because it implied claim of high cooling performance in extreme con-
ditions), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC,
301 F.2d 534, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding claim that government document
implied approval or endorsement of product deceptive because document was
consent decree settling criminal misrepresentation charges).
302. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, T 20,912.
303. Id. T 20,915 nn.31, 32. See also Warner Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398,
1489-90 (1975) (holding that close proximity of the phrases "Kills germs by the
millions on contact" and "For general oral hygiene, bad breath, colds and resul-
tant sore throats" implied product could cure colds and sore throats), aff'd, 562
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
304. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, T 20,911 n.4; see, e.g.,
Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding
failure to disclose where substantial weight losses resulting from use of product
were rare and product was a health risk), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); J.B.
Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1967) (finding failure to dis-
close that most people who suffered from advertised symptoms would not bene-
fit from product advertised as a cure).
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when the advertiser does not have a reasonable basis to believe
the truth of its claim.30 5 This "reasonable basis doctrine" forms
the root of the advertising substantiation program.30 6 Indeed,
nearly all complaints, decisions, and consent orders involving
deceptive advertising state that advertisers should substantiate
their claims.30 7
The second element of the FTC Test determines whether
the representation in question is likely to mislead hypothetical
"reasonable consumers under the circumstances."308 If the ad-
vertising targets a specific audience, then the Commission will
consider the probable reaction of a reasonable member of that
group.30 9 To determine whether a consumer has acted reason-
ably, the Commission considers the percentage of people who
view the advertisement as deceptive.310 The FTC does not em-
305. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, 1 20,911 n.5. See Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 451-52 (1972) (finding Firestone had no
basis for believing that its tires "stopped 25% quicker"), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); National Dynamics, 82 F.T.C. 488, 549-
50 (1973) (finding National Dynamics had inadequate substantiation of its
claims about battery additives), aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 492 F.2d
1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974), reissued, 85 F.T.C. 391 (1976);
Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 813 n.37 (1984).
306. Shafer, supra note 285, at 4. The program began in 1971 with the issu-
ance of a resolution requiring advertisers, upon request, to submit whatever
support they had for a claim in question. Federal Trade Commission, Special
Reports Relating to Advertising Claims, 36 Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971). The origi-
nal purpose was to enable consumers to make rational buying decisions and to
encourage competitors to challenge unfounded advertisements. Id. The doc-
trine was announced, but not applied, in Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 73-74 (1972).
As of January 1, 1983, the FTC had issued 21 litigated orders and 126 consent
orders related to the making of unsubstantiated claims. Federal Trade Com-
mission, Advertising Substantiation Program, Request for Comments, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10,471, 10,472 (1983).
307. Shafer, supra note 285, at 4.
308. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, 9120,912. The prior defini-
tion was referred to as the "fool's test" and found deception where an advertis-
ing claim had the "tendency or capacity to deceive." BEALES & MUM, supra
note 10, at 122. The use of a "reasonable consumer test" appears to be a shift
toward a free market policy. Karns, supra note 291, at 409-13.
309. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, T 20,913. See, e.g., Travel
King, Inc. 86 F.T.C. 715, 719 (1975) (finding the seriously ill and their families
to be target audience); Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963) (measur-
ing advertising aimed at children by the impact on children).
310. Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1965) (holding
a practice deceptive if a "substantial percentage" of people could have been
deceived); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961) (using
"substantial portion" test); Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation
Rule: Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to
the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8350 (1964) (using "sub-
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ploy a bright-line percentage cutoff.3 11 Instead, it attempts to
discover whether the seller has conveyed the allegedly deceptive
message to some determinable number of people.312
Once a claim is found to be an express or implied represen-
tation that is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer, the FTC
must show that the representation is material under the third
element of the FTC Test. To be material, the claim must likely
affect consumers' choice of, or conduct regarding, the advertised
item.313 The FTC focuses on the potential as well as the actual
impact of an advertisement.314 The FTC presumes that sellers
make substantive claims to affect consumers' choices about a
product and the very existence of these claims ordinarily pro-
vides sufficient evidence that they are material.31 5
Cliffdale demonstrates that the FTC will aggressively pros-
ecute advertisers making allegedly false or deceptive environ-
mental claims. A series of cases, arising both before and after
Cliffdale, establishes the FTC's intention to prosecute compa-
nies and individuals for making misleading environmental ad-
vertising claims. In Standard Oil of California,316 the FTC
charged Chevron, a Standard Oil Company, with misrepresent-
stantial segment" test); see also Karns, supra note 291, at 405-06 (describing
"substantial segment" test).
311. One court held that the deception standard should protect "the igno-
rant, the unthinking, and the credulous." Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167
(7th Cir. 1942). Such a standard would almost certainly result in a low percent-
age requirement.
312. Bantam Books, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 779, 787 (1958) (asking whether "portion
of the purchasing public" has been or could have been deceived); Bristol-Myers
Co., 85 F.T.C. 688, 744 (1975) (holding that "substantial number" of people
must have been deceived); Preston, FTC's Identification, supra note 291, at
1256.
313. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, 20,916; American Home
Products Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 368 (1981) (holding that a violation occurs if the
misleading claim or omission "would be a material factor in the consumer's de-
cision to purchase the product"), aff'd as modified, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982).
314. Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 816 (1984), In re Cliffdale As-
soc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 62 F.T.C.
1259, 1273 ("A] misrepresentation may be material in affecting a buyer's choice
even though it does not relate to the product's quality or merits."), remanded,
326 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1963), rev'd and enforced, 380 U.S. 374 (1965); see Pres-
ton, Definition of Deceptiveness, supra note 291, at 1046.
315. Deception Policy Statement, supra note 292, 20,916 n.46. The
Supreme Court has stated that it could be assumed that "the willingness of a
business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are interested
in the advertising." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm.,
447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980).
316. 84 F.T.C. 1401 (1974), aff'd as modified, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978),
reissued, 96 F.T.C. 380 (1980).
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ing in its advertisements that an additive in Chevron's gasoline
would cause consumers' cars to produce pollution-free ex-
haust.3 17 After several tests failed to verify Chevron's claim, the
FTC determined that the statements and representations were
false, misleading, and deceptive. Furthermore, the Commission
held liable the advertising agency employed to market the
product.318
In Union Carbide Corp.,319 a producer of pesticides claimed
that its products were absolutely safe for humans and the envi-
ronment when, in fact, they were not. Union Carbide even ac-
knowledged the environmental risks of its pesticide by placing a
product warning on its label that disclosed its danger to
humans, water supplies, and food.3 20 The Commission found
Union Carbide's advertising claim deceptive because it tended to
mislead a substantial portion of insecticide users into thinking
they were handling safe products. 32' The FTC initially ordered
Union Carbide to stop representing that the products were safe,
but later amended the remedy to allow safety claims provided
such claims were accompanied by specified warnings. 322
More recently, the FTC focused on the latest wave of green
advertising. In Zipatone, Inc., 32 3 products containing aerosol
spray propellants were advertised as "ozone-friendly" and
"ozone-safe," even though the propellant qualified as a Class I
ozone depleting substance. 324 The Commission found the adver-
tising claims false and ordered the producer to cease advertising
317. Id. at 1406.
318. Id. at 1476. The advertising agency was charged with knowing or hav-
ing reason to know that the advertisements were false, misleading, and decep-
tive, because it had actually participated in developing the advertisements and
knew the results of research done on the additive. Id. at 1474-76.
319. 84 F.T.C. 591 (1974); see also Hercules, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 605, 605 (1974)
(ordering company to stop claiming that its insecticides were "absolutely safe to
man or the environment"); FMC Corp., 86 F.T.C. 897 (1975) (same).
320. Union Carbide Corp., 84 F.T.C. at 594.
321. Id. at 594-96.
322. Id. at 603.
323. No. 902-3366, 1990 FTC LEXIS 512 (F.T.C. Dec. 11, 1990); see also Je-
rome Russell Cosmetics, No. C-3341, 1991 FTC LEXIS 408 (F.T.C. Aug. 21,
1991) (ordering company to stop claiming its products were "ozone safe" or
"ozone friendly"); Tech Spray, Inc., No. 902-3309, 1991 FTC LEXIS 521 (F.T.C.
Dec. 18, 1991) (ordering company to stop representing that its products were
"ozone friendly").
324. Class I ozone depleting substances are those that harm the atmos-
pheric ozone layer and are listed as such by the EPA in compliance with the
Clean Air Act of 1990. Class I Ozone Depleting Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 82
(1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7671(a) (Supp IV 1994).
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its product as "ozone-friendly."325 In addition, the Commission
imposed certain inspection and disclosure requirements and lev-
ied sanctions against the individually responsible corporate
officer.32
6
The FTC has brought actions against sellers who claimed
their plastic products were "improved, photo degradable and
safe for the environment."3 27 The FTC found that the producers
lacked a reasonable basis for these statements and that the
claims misled consumers.3 28 The FTC ordered the producers to
stop making the offending claims, but subsequently allowed
modified advertising claims.3 29 The modified claims stated that
the packaging products will break down and become part of usa-
ble compost along with the contents when disposed of in com-
posting programs.330 The seller must accompany this claim
with a clarifying statement that the products will not degrade in
landfills, that composting facilities are not available every-
where, and that composting plastic packaging products will only
degrade in composting facilities.331
In spite of the FTC's demonstrated willingness to prosecute
misleading environmental claims, environmental and industry
groups demanded,332 and eventually received, uniform guide-
lines for advertising environmental attributes. On July 28,
1992, the FTC issued guidelines "to help reduce consumer confu-
sion and prevent the false or misleading use of environmental
terms in advertising and labeling products in the market-
325. Zipatone, 1990 F.T.C. LEXIS 512, at *4.
326. Id.
327. First Brands Corp., No. C-3358, 1992 FTC LEXIS 27 (F.T.C. Jan. 3,
1992) (ordering corporation to cease representations that its plastic bags were
"degradable," "biodegradable," or "photodegradable"); American Enviro Prod-
ucts, No. C-3376, 1992 FTC LEXIS 122 (F.T.C. Mar. 18, 1992) (ordering com-
pany to stop marketing its disposable diapers as "biodegradable"); RMED Int'l,
Inc., No. C-3382, 1992 FTC LEXIS 139 (F.T.C. May 14, 1992) (same).
328. First Brands Corp., 1992 FTC LEXIS 27, at *2; American Enviro Prod-
ucts, 1992 FTC LEXIS 122, at *2; RMED Int'l, 1992 FTC LEXIS 139, at *4.
329. RMED Int'l, 1992 FTC LEXIS 139, at *10,*11 (allowing company to
represent truthfully that its diapers will compost, if it also provides information
that proper composting facilities are generally unavailable in the United
States).
330. First Brands Corp., 1992 FTC LEXIS 27, at *6; RMED Int'l, 1992 FTC
LEXIS 139, at *10; American Enviro Products, 1992 FTC LEXIS 122, at *7,*8.
331. See, e.g., RMED Int'l, 1992 FTC LEXIS 139, at *9; First Brands Corp.
1992 FTC LEXIS 27, at *6; American Enviro Products, 1992 FTC LEXIS 122, at
*7.
332. Rathe, supra note 10, at 450.
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place."333 Although these guidelines are not legally enforceable
and do not rigidly define environmental terms, they do provide
specific examples of permissible and deceptive advertising
claims. By clarifying how advertisers are to use terms such as
"recyclable," "degradable," "compostable," "recycled content,"
"source reduction," "refillable," and "ozone safe,"334 the FTC has
provided an informal "safe harbor" for advertisers who wish to
tout the environmental attributes of their products.
2. State Regulation
States have also actively pursued actions against advertis-
ers that make potentially misleading claims. All fifty states and
the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the Uniform
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act.33 5 The Act, often
referred to as the "little FTC Act,"3 36 provides both public en-
forcement and private remedies.
Almost every state consumer protection law provides for
private suits.3 3 7 Because many consumer cases involve claims
that would not cover litigation expenses, most states allow ag-
grieved consumers to recover minimum or multiple damages, at-
torney fees, and costs in addition to actual damages. 338 Those
provisions aim to encourage private suits to supplement the en-
forcement resources of state and federal agencies. Notwith-
standing the generous private remedy provisions, state agencies
initiate the bulk of enforcement actions.3 39
333. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GUIDES FOR THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING CLAIMs: THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSIoN ACT To ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING AND MARKETING PRACTICES
(1992), reported in 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 10626 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (Nov. 1992).
334. Id.; see also Guidance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and "Recycl-
able" and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed.
Reg. 49,992 (1991.)
335. Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under
"Little FTC Acts": Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 Dim L. REV. 373,
376 n.11 (1990) (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUGGESTED LEG-
ISLATION: UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAw-
REVISION).
336. Id. at 373.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 374-75.
339. Stephen Gardner & Albert N. Shelden, See Dick and Jane Sue: A Pri-
mer on State Consumer Protection Laws, Mar. 4, 1993, available in Westlaw,
C801 ALI-ABA Database.
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Most state laws broadly prohibit "unfair and deceptive"
trade practices, language taken directly from the FTCA.340 The
terms "unfair" and "deceptive" stem either from cases decided
under state law or from FTC regulations and case law.3 41 Other
guidance in defining "unfair" and "deceptive" comes from state
enforcement agency regulations or a statutorily provided "laun-
dry list" of prohibited practices. 342
Although most states look to the FTCA and the FTC for in-
terpretive guidance, variations in enforcement are inevitable.
Several states, however, have joined to pursue concurrent en-
forcement against several national advertising campaigns that
allegedly contained misleading green claims.343 In several of
these cases, the FTC has also pursued concurrent enforcement
under the FTCA. 344 The facts of the state cases resemble the
FTC cases discussed in the prior section. Because most states
look to the FTCA for guidance, not surprisingly, the sanctions
the states impose resemble those under the FTCA.3 45
In 1990, seven states separately sued Mobil Chemical Oil
Corporation alleging that Mobil had marketed its Hefty trash
bags as "degradable" despite its knowledge that the bags would
not degrade in landfills.346 Mobil settled the lawsuits by agree-
ing not to represent that its plastic bags were "degradable" that
its plastic bags offered any environmental benefits unless Mobil
states the specific nature of the benefit and substantiates that
claim. 347
Similarly, ten states simultaneously sued American Enviro
Products, Inc. ("AEP"), alleging that AEP's claim that its dispos-
able diaper was "biodegradable" was both unsubstantiated and
340. Karns, supra note 335, at 376; Gardner & Shelden, supra note 339, at
328.
341. Karns, supra note 335, at 376-77.
342. Gardner & Shelden, supra note 339, at 330.
343. Gardner, supra note 10, at 38.
344. Id. at 37.
345. Id. at 38.
346. Id.
347. The FTC ordered Mobil to cease from representing:
(1) that any such plastic bag is 'degradable,' 'biodegradable,' or
'photodegradable'; or (2) through the use of [similar terms] that the
degradability of any such plastic bag offers any environmental benefits
when disposed of as trash in a sanitary landfill, unless at the time of
making such representation, respondent possesses and relies upon a
reasonable basis ....
Mobil Oil Corp., No. C-3415, 1993 FTC LEXIS 22, at *6, *7 (F.T.C. Feb. 1,
1993); see Reuters, Mobil Settles on Hefty Bags, N.Y. TIEs, June 28, 1991, at
D4.
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deceptive.348 AEP agreed to cease making any claims of
degradability or any environmental claims other than specific
claims for which the company can provide prior substantia-
tion.3 49 The settlement between AEP and the ten states sub-
stantively mirrors AEP's settlement with the FTC.350
Another multi-state group brought an action against Al-
berto-Culver Company ("Alberto") for promoting aerosol hair
spray products as "ozone friendly" and "environmentally
safe."3 51 Alberto made the claim because the products did not
contain CFCs. Congress, however, had banned ozone-depleting
CFCs in 1978 and thus the absence of CFCs in Alberto's prod-
ucts did not distinguish its product from other products. 352 In
addition, the aerosol products contained other chemicals that
depleted ozone and contributed to the smog problem. Alberto
agreed that unless the company had prior substantiation, it
would stop representing that its aerosol hair spray product,
which contained ozone-depleting substances, or other volatile or-
ganic compounds, had any environmental benefit.353 Further-
more, regardless of any substantiation, Alberto could not
represent that any product containing any ozone-depleting sub-
stances or volatile organic chemicals was "ozone friendly."3 54
348. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 180. See American Enviro Products, Inc.,
No. C-3376, 1992 FTC LEXIS 122, at *7 (F.T.C. Mar. 18, 1992) (ordering com-
pany not to claim its product was degradable, biodegradable, or photodegrad-
able unless there is competent and reliable scientific evidence to substantiate
the claim of degradability or environmental benefit).
349. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 155 n.35.
350. American Enviro Products, 1992 FTC LEXIS 122, at *7,*8.
351. Watman, supra note 10, at 175.
352. Gardner, supra note 10, at 47.
353. Id. at 48.
354. Id. The same 10 states brought suit against Tetra-Pak, Inc. and Com-
bibloc, manufacturers of drink boxes, for claiming that their drink boxes were
as recyclable as newspaper. Id. In fact, it is very expensive to recycle drink
boxes and recycling facilities are not universally available. The companies
agreed to disclose the limited nature of recycling, or to limit their claims of
recyclabiity to those areas where it is available. In addition, the companies
agreed not to represent, without prior substantiation, that drink boxes offer any
environmental benefits. Id.
Another diaper manufacturer, Procter & Gamble Company, advertised its
disposable diapers as "compostable," and represented that composting facilities
for the diapers were currently available. Howett, supra note 10, at 430. In fact,
the diapers were only 80% compostable, and moreover, household trash com-
posting facilities were not generally available. Following simultaneous state
enforcement, Proctor & Gamble agreed to discontinue its misleading ads, and in
the future, to give greater emphasis to the limits of compostability of its
diapers. Michael Parrish, P&G Agrees to Modify Its Disposable Diaper Ads,
L.A. Tnmds, Nov. 15, 1991, at D3.
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Although states appear to have acted more aggressively
than the FTC in pursuing allegedly deceptive environmental ad-
vertising, such behavior may not be in the public interest. Un-
like the FTC, many states cling to the "fools test" of deception,355
which defines deception as the "tendency or capacity to
deceive."356 Several commentators argue that the "fools test"
unwisely fails to recognize that some deception is inevitable be-
cause information is a costly good.357 Moreover, the incentives
leading to heightened state enforcement may have nothing to do
with promoting efficiency, but rather, may be related to benefits
inuring to the state official. 358 Aggressive state enforcement
thus may contravene the public interest.
3. Private Litigation
In addition to government enforcement, consumers or com-
petitors may also bring suits against sellers for false, mislead-
ing, or deceptive advertising under either state or federal law.3 59
These private rights of action provide an important supplement
to public enforcement. The vagaries of private litigation, how-
ever, may limit its usefulness in the area of green claims.
Common law tort actions, such as negligent misrepresenta-
tion or deceit, may provide relief for wronged consumers.3 60
Consumers, however, have little chance of prevailing on a cause
of action for deceit because of the extremely difficult task of
proving scienter, i.e., the intent to deceive.36 ' Negligent misrep-
resentation claims are also difficult to establish. Under the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts formulation of a negligent
misrepresentation claim, a cause of action lies with the group of
persons for whose benefit the information is provided (i.e., the
355. BEALus & Minus, supra note 10, at 122; see also supra notes 282-334
and accompanying text (discussing FTC regulation of deception).
356. J. Howard Beales, What State Regulators Should Learn from the FTC
Experience in Regulating Advertising, 10 J. PUB. POL'Y & ARKETING 101
(1991).
357. See id. at 101-13 (discussing how limits of time and resources in adver-
tising necessarily lead to some misinterpretation by consumers).
358. BFALEs & Mums, supra note 10, at 134-46.
359. See Ross D. Petty, Competitor Suits Against False Advertising: Is Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act a Pro-Consumer Rule or an Anticompetitive Tool?,
20 U. BALT. L. REv. 381, 381-82 (1991).
360. DEE PRDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND =ri LAw § 2.08 (1992); see,
e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 519 (1969) (stating that plain-
tiff had a cause of action for physical injuries against Good Housekeeping when
she slipped while wearing shoes that bore its seal of approval).
361. PRDGEN, supra note 360, § 2.05.
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consumers).36 2 The Restatement expressly provides recovery for
pecuniary loss, 363 but courts only reluctantly extend liability
when plaintiffs claim an intangible economic loss.3 64 In addi-
tion, proving reliance and causation may become insurmounta-
ble for consumer plaintiffs.
In most cases, the pecuniary loss that a single consumer
suffers from deceptive or misleading environmental claims is so
small that no individual consumer will have a sufficient incen-
tive to bring suit.36 5 Although the solution to this problem may
seem to lie in class action suits, consumer class actions can be
difficult to maintain in state courts.366 Thus, despite the oppor-
tunity for a prevailing plaintiff to recover fees and costs, class
actions are unlikely to provide significant relief.3 67
Competitors may sue for deceptive environmental claims
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.3 68 The standard for de-
ceptiveness under the Lanham Act nearly mirrors the standard
under the FTCA.3 69 Although early interpretations of the Lan-
ham Act required plaintiffs to prove the elements of a common
law "passing off" action,370 more recent cases indicate that the
statute creates a remedy for a competitor's deceptive advertis-
362. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h (1977).
363. Id. § 552(1).
364. PRIDGEN, supra note 360, § 2.08.
365. See Maury Tepper, Note, False Advertising Claims and the Revision of
the LanhamAct: A Step in Which Direction?, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 957, 966 (1991)
(explaining that the damage false advertising causes an individual is usually
small).
366. Id.
367. See PRIUGEN, supra note 360, § 6.06(1) (discussing recovery of attorney
fees and costs under little FTC acts).
368. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Under this section, there is liability for any
"false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact which ... (2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristic, qualities, or geographical origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities." Id. See Tepper, supra note
365, at 958 (explaining that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act allows for an action
against false advertising about one's own or another person's goods or services).
369. Indeed, "[tlhe difference between Lanham Act and FTC Act definitions'
of deceptiveness... has been in terms and not in actual concepts." Preston,
Definition of Deceptiveness, supra note 291, at 1039.
370. A "passing off" or "palming off" claim arose at common law when a
seller substituted one brand of goods for the brand the customer ordered. See J.
THoMAs McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAm COMPETITION § 25:1 (2d ed.
1984).
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ing.3 71 Courts apparently have concluded that competitors may
sue to protect consumers from deception. 372
Although section 43(a) provides a money damages rem-
edy,3 73 the preferred form of relief appears to be injunctive. 374
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show: ir-
reparable harm, and either a likelihood of success on the merits
or "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tip-
ping decidedly in its favor."37 5 A court will presume irreparable
harm when the plaintiff and defendant compete against each
other.376 To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, a
plaintiff must show that "a not insubstantial number of consum-
ers receive a false or misleading impression from [the advertise-
ment in question." 377
Although competitors clearly have standing under the Lan-
ham Act, courts have split over whether consumers do.378 The
Third and Ninth Circuits allow consumers standing, pointing to
the language of section 43(a) that grants standing to "any per-
son" likely to be injured by the falsehood.3 79 The Second and
371. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d
Cir. 1954) (rejecting that a cause of action under § 43(a) required passing off
and finding nothing to indicate "that this section is merel declarative of ex-
isting law"); Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Note, The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Stan-
dards Governing the Regulation of False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 339, 345-46 (1991) (citing the L'Aiglon Apparel
decision); Robert S. Saunders, Note, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic Justi-
fication for Competitors'Actions for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 563, 572 (1991) (same).
372. See Petty, supra note 359, at 82 ("Other commentators have suggested
that the Lanham Act may be efficient in that it allows competitors to act as
avengers of consumer interest by suing one another for false advertising.")
(footnote omitted).
373. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(indicating that proof of actual deception is necessary to recover damages);
Saunders, supra note 371, at 574 (citing to the Skil Corp. decision).
374. Saunders, supra note 371, at 575.
375. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 690 F.2d 312,314-15 (2d Cir.
1982); see also Stem's Miracle-Gro v. Shark Products, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1077,
1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (using the Coca-Cola test); Emons Industries, Inc. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 749 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Southland
Corp. v. Mir, 748 F. Supp. 969, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
376. McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d
Cir. 1988); see also Saunders, supra note 371, at 576 (citing to the McNeilab
decision).
377. McNeilab, 501 F. Supp. at 528; see also Saunders, supra note 371, at
576.
378. Tepper, supra note 365, at 960-63.
379. Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that § 43(a) grants a right of action to any person damaged by a misrepresenta-
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Seventh Circuits, however, deny standing, limiting plaintiffs to
those whose commercial interests are likely to be damaged.380
4. Legal Regulation of Third-Party Certifications
The FTCA deceptiveness, unfairness, and substantiation
doctrines apply to third-party certifiers as well as direct adver-
tisers. Indeed, the FTC has pursued enforcement actions
against third-party certifiers. In Hearst Magazines,38 1 the FTC
issued a cease and desist order against Good Housekeeping for
failing to back its seal of approval with adequate product test-
ing.3 8 2 The FTC also alleged that the wording of the Good
Housekeeping consumer guarantee implied an unlimited guar-
anty.38 3 The FTC required that any limitations on the guaran-
ties be "explicitly stated in immediate conjunction with all such
representation of guaranty."38 4
In the 1970s and 1980s, the FTC issued Guides Concerning
use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising ("En-
dorsement Guides"), which may indicate when the FTC would
pursue enforcement against environmental certifiers.38 5 In-
deed, Green Seal considers the guidelines applicable to its certi-
fication process.38 6
The Endorsement Guides require that endorsements "al-
ways reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience
of the endorser."38 7 A certifier must disclose any commercial
tion); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that § 43(a)
gave standing to a broad class of persons, both juristic and natural).
380. Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 691-92 (2d
Cir.) (relying on language from § 45 referring to protection of persons engaged
in commerce as basis for conclusion that relief under § 43(a) was available only
for commercial interests), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Dovenmuehle v.
Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 697 (7th Cir. 1989) (denying
standing to family members seeking to enjoin the use of the family name on a
business they formerly owned).
381. Hearst Magazines, Inc., 32 F.T.C. 1440 (1941); see also Hanberry v.
Hearst Corp., 81 Cal Rptr. 519, 519 (1969) (holding that plaintiff had a cause of
action for physical injuries against Good Housekeeping when she slipped while
wearing shoes that bore its seal of approval).
382. Hearst Magazines, 32 F.T.C. at 1461-63.
383. Id. at 1456-58.
384. Id. at 1463.
385. Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertis-
ing, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0-255.5 (1994). The underlying policy concerning endorse-
ments may provide additional guidance as to when the FTC will pursue
enforcement actions against certifiers.
386. GREEN SEAL, INc., supra note 255, at 2.
387. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (1994).
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connection between itself and the seller of certified products. 388
If an organization tests products and represents itself as an ex-
pert in the field of testing, it must use qualified experts and
"standards previously adopted by the organization and suitable
for judging the relevant merits of such products."38 9 The expert
endorsement must be supported by an examination of the prod-
uct "at least as extensive as someone with the same degree of
expertise would normally need to conduct in order to support the
conclusions presented."390
Litigation, whether initiated by a public entity or a private
party, has effectively provided a means to address the problems
presented by misleading or false advertising claims. The reme-
dial mechanisms discussed in this section have had a sufficient
deterrent effect on false or deceptive advertising. Many com-
mentators, however, argue that case-by-case litigation is an im-
perfect means for regulating green claims because of selective
enforcement, understaffmg, and evidentiary obstacles.391 These
limitations lead many to call for increased regulation of green
claims. Several of these proposals are discussed in the next
section.
B. DEFINITIONAL STATUTES
1. Proposed Federal Legislation
Senate Bill 615 ("S. 615" or the "Lautenberg Bill"),3 92 pro-
posed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, is the most ambitious
388. Id. § 255.5.
389. Id. § 255.4.
390. Id. § 255.3(b).
391. See, e.g., Grodsky, supra note 10, at 156.
392. Senators Frank Lautenberg and Joseph Lieberman introduced Senate
Bill 615, the Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991 ("The Act"), in order
to decrease consumer confusion over environmental claims. See Lautenberg,
supra note 10, at 307, 313-40; S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC.
S3034-39 (1991). The Act directed the EPA, in conjunction with an independ-
ent advisory board established by the Act, to create a common set of definitions
and standards for various environmental claims. See Lautenberg, supra note
10, at 307, 313-40. Likewise, the proposed legislation called for certifications of
products bearing environmental claims, such as "recyclable" to meet the mini-
mum standards and definitions established by the EPA and independent advi-
sory board. Id. Congressman Gerry Sikorski introduced a companion bill in the
House of Representatives, bearing the same title as the legislation proposed in
the Senate. H.R. 1408, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. 1669 (1991). Sen-
ators Lautenberg and Lieberman had proposed a substantially similar piece of
legislation, The Marketing Claims Act of 1990, in the session just prior to the
session in which Senators Lautenberg and Lieberman presented Senate Bill
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proposal for federal legislation.3 93 The Lautenberg Bill would
require the EPA to establish uniform standards for environmen-
tal marketing claims.3 94 The EPA would establish standards
with advice from an independent board containing representa-
tives of industry, and environmental and consumer groups.3 95
More specifically, the Lautenberg Bill would require the EPA to
define certain terms396 with minimum threshold require-
ments.397 Any company that makes an environmentally related
advertising claim would need to certify that its claim met the
requirements of the Lautenberg Bill. 398
2. State Legislation
Several states have adopted statutes that define certain
terms commonly used in environmental claims and prohibit the
use of these terms unless the product meets the statutory defini-
615 (Marketing Claims Act of 1991). S. 3218, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG.
REC. 16,019-22 (1990).
393. See Lautenberg, supra note 10, at 305 (arguing for enactment of the
Environmental Marketing Claims Act).
394. S. 615 §§ 3(6), 4 (empowering the EPA Administrator to establish a reg-
ulatory scheme for environmental marketing claims); see also S. 3218 §§ 3(6),
4 (same); H.R. 1408 §§ 3(6), 4 (same).
395. S. 615 §§ 5, 5(b), 6(a) (directing the formation and membership of an
independent advisory board and empowering the board to make recommenda-
tions as to the definitions and standards to be used in the regulation of environ-
mental marketing claims); see also S. 3218 §§ 5, 5(b), 6(a) (same); H.R. 1408
§§ 5, 5(b), 6(a) (same).
396. These terms include: "recyclable," "recycled content," "compostable,"
"ozone neutral," "source reduced," "refillable," "reusable," and "nontoxic." See S.
615 § 6(b) (listing terms to be defined by the EPA in conjunction with an in-
dependent advisory board); see also S. 3218 § 6(b) (same); H.R. 1408 § 6(b)
(same).
397. S. 615 §§ 6(b)(7)(A)(i)-(ii) (setting minimum threshold requirement for
"recycled content" claims at 25% post-consumer waste until the year 2000 and
50% post-consumer waste thereafter); S.615 § 6(b)(7)(B) (establishing the mini-
mum threshold requirement for "recyclable" claims as products or packages re-
cycled at 25% per annum until the year 2000, and at 50% per annum
thereafter); S. 615 § 6(b)(7)(C) (stating that the minimum threshold require-
ment for "refillable" or "reusable" claims is that the package is refillable or reus-
able at least five times); S. 615 § 6(b)(7)(D) (defining "compostable"). For
similar provisions, see S. 3218 § 6(b)7)(A)i)-(ii) (minimum threshold for "re-
cycled content"); H.R. 1408 §§ 6(b)(7)(A)(i)-(ii) (same); S. 3218 § 6(b)(7)(B) (mini-
mum threshold for "recyclable"); H.R. 1408 § 6(b)(7)(B) (same); S. 3218
§ 6(b)(7)(C) (minimum threshold for "refillable" or "reusable"); H.R. 1408
§ 6(b)(7)(C) (same); S. 3218 § 6(b)(7)(D) (defining "compostable"); H.R. 1408
§ 6(b)(7)(D) (defining minimum threshold requirements for "biodegradable,"
"compostable," "decomposable," "degradable," and "photodegradable").
398. S. 615 § 7 (establishing a certification system for products proposing to
bear environmental claims covered by the Environmental Marketing Claims
Act of 1991); see also S. 3218 § 7 (same); H.R. 1408 § 7 (same).
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tion. The definitions vary widely from state to state. For exam-
ple, New York defines "recycled" on a product-specific basis and
has established threshold levels of post-consumer material.3 99
California defines "recycled" as an article containing "at least 10
percent, by weight, postconsumer material."400 Rhode Island
does not specify a threshold, but requires disclosure of the
amounts of pre-consumer and post-consumer material.40'
The states also differ on the number of terms defined.
Rhode Island,40 2 New York,403 Connecticut, 40 4 and New Hamp-
shire40 5 all define "recycled" and "recyclable." Wisconsin also
defines "degradable."40 6 California407 and Indiana 4° 8 define "re-
cyclable," "recycled," "ozone friendly," "biodegradable," and
"photo degradable." The trend appears to be towards defining
more, rather than fewer terms. In addition, a few states require
that documentation substantiating environmental claims be
made available to any member of the public who requests it. 4 ° 9
The documentation approach, however, fails in two major re-
spects, because it does not prescribe any particular form that
the documentation must take or establish any mechanism for
encouraging public requests.4 10
Uniform definitions implicitly require determining environ-
mental policy prior to implementing the green marketing regu-
399. N.Y. Coip. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.2(l) (1990).
400. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17,508.5(e) (West Supp. 1994).
401. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 23-18.8-3 (Supp. 1993) (authorizing director of the
Department of Environmental Management to adopt standards for recycled
products). Rhode Island requires paperboard packaging to be composed of at
least 50% recycled paper in order to bear a recycled emblem. Id. See Howett,
supra note 10, at 434 (citing to the remarks of Keith Tice, National Director of
Packaging and Labeling for Sears, Roebuck & Co., at the FTC public hearings
on environmental marketing and advertising guides, asserting that disclosure
is required).
402. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.8-3 (director of department of environmental
management setting standards for "recycled" and "recyclable").
403. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.2(k)-(/) (1990).
404. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-255c (West Supp. 1993) (directing the
commissioner of environmental protection to adopt official symbols for recycled
and recyclable, and regulations for their use).
405. N.H. REV. STAT. Am. § 149-N:2 (Supp. 1993).
406. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.295 (West Supp. 1992) (directing the depart-
ment of environment to adopt standards for the use of the term "degradable").
407. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17,508.5 (West Supp. 1994).
408. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-17-2 to 24-5-17-10 (West Supp. 1994).
409. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17,508(b) (West Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 24-5-17-13 (West Supp. 1994).
410. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17,508(b) (West Supp. 1994) (lacking re-
quirements for specific documentation and incentives for public requests); IND.
CODE ANN. § 24-5-17-13 (West Supp. 1994).
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lations. Before adopting a minimum threshold of twenty-five
percent minimum recycled content to allow sellers to make a
"Made From Recycled Materials" claim, a legislative or regula-
tory body must first determine that twenty-five percent is the
appropriate policy goal. Although commentators have consist-
ently called for uniform national standards and criteria for envi-
ronmental claims, 411 standardized definitions restrict the flow of
information to consumers. A manufacturer that has developed a
revolutionary process allowing the use of ten percent recycled
material could not label its product as "recycled" if the uniform
definition requires twenty-five percent recycled content. The
Lautenberg Bill 412 would prohibit the manufacturer from mak-
ing any claims concerning the recycled content of its product,
even though the use of ten percent recycled material may dra-
matically improve the environmental status quo. The uniform
definition approach restricts information available to consumers
and thus limits consumer choice.
C. Eco-LOGO STATUTES
New York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island have adopted
state-sponsored recycling logos to "assist in the development and
promotion of local waste reduction, source separation and re-
cycling programs."41 3 In each case, a state agency establishes
standards for granting, overseeing, and enforcing the licensing
of the logo. To date, no state has adopted a mandatory logo pro-
gram, although such a mandatory system has been proposed in
New Jersey.414 These state-sponsored logo schemes suffer from
many of the same difficulties that state-sponsored labels have
experienced in foreign countries.
Many countries outside the United States have established
"environmental labelling," a voluntary process whereby a pri-
vate or public body grants labels to inform consumers about a
product's environmental impact. Survey evidence reveals that
consumers prefer products that contain the "environmental la-
411. See, e.g., Lautenberg, supra note 10, at 307-08 (arguing for the estab-
lishment of uniform and accurate standards and definitions for environmental
marketing claims); GREEN REPORT II, supra note 4, at 1-4 (same).
412. See supra note 397 and accompanying text (describing specific provi-
sions of the Lautenberg Bill).
413. N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw § 27-0717(2).1 (McKinney Supp. 1993);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.. § 149-N (1990 & Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.8-3
(Supp. 1993).
414. 1992 N.J. A.B. 419, 205th Leg., 1st Sess., available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Lib., NJTEXT File.
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bel."415 As of 1991, Germany, Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
Finland, Austria, Portugal, and France all had environmental
labelling programs. 416 In addition, the European Community
has established its own Community label. 4 17
In most cases, a committee determines, or merely suggests
to a government minister, those product categories that should
be eligible for labelling.418 Expert working groups help define
the product category scope and the requirements that a product
must meet to qualify for a label. 41 9 Manufacturers may volunta-
rily submit their products for consideration and, if they satisfy
the criteria, sign a contract for a period of years and pay a fee for
the use of the label.420 The labelling body may periodically raise
the threshold criteria if the product category as a whole has im-
415. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOIIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES 28-30 (1991) [hereinafter OECD].
416. Twenty-two countries were expected to have environmental labels by
1992. Id. at 13. Germany's Blue Angel labeling scheme was the first to debut in
1978. ENVmNomiNNTAL DATA SERVICES, LTD., Eco-LABELS: PRODUCT MANAGE-
MENT IN A GREENER EUROPE 10 (1989). This followed recommendations by the
OECD that member countries develop comprehensive waste management poli-
cies. Id.
417. Council Regulation 880/92 on a Community eco-label award scheme,
1992 O.J. (L 99) 1.
418. See OECD, supra note 415, at 17-18. The OECD suggests that award-
ing the label in a particular product category should have the potential to sig-
nificantly reduce environmental damage. Some of the products in the category
should pose a significant environmental danger, while similar products within
the category should be more benign. Some product categories, such as bullets
and household chemicals, may be excluded altogether due to concerns over the
environmental impact of all products in the category. Id. This is so despite the
fact that some products within these categories (i.e., lead-free bullets) are less
harmful than others. Id.
419. Id. at 22. The proper scope for a product category is sometimes prob-
lematic. Autos and bicycles are not close enough substitutes such that they
could be put in the same category. One might think, however, that aerosol and
roll-on deodorants could be. This is not the case in the German program, where
CFC-free aerosols may have a label, while less harmful roll-ons may not, be-
cause they are treated as separate products. Environmental Protection: Eco-
Babble, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 84, 84. This may lead to greater con-
sumer confusion. See id.; OECD, supra note 415, at 23.
420. At least one company, Henkel, a German aerosol manufacturer, has
products that would qualify for the German program's Blue Angel label, but
does not participate in the labelling program. ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SERVICES,
LTD., supra note 416, at 24. Henkel believes that the label causes differentia-
tion between one product that is environmentally compatible and others that
have identical properties but carry no distinguishing mark. Id. Some govern-
ment run programs have set a goal of being self-financed, although none cur-
rently is. OECD, supra note 415, at 27. The Canadian scheme was expected to
be self-financing by 1990. ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SERVICES, LTD., supra note
416, at 31.
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proved its environmental performance. 42' Although the extent
of public participation varies, all decision-making or advisory
bodies have broad representation, including members from con-
sumer, environmental, and industry interests. 4 22
All labelling programs attempt to measure a given product's
"cradle-to-grave" impact using some form of the product "life-cy-
cle" approach.423 Because comparing the myriad of environmen-
tal degradations is difficult, labelling programs typically focus
on a few specific aspects. 42 4 These criteria are set forth as rela-
tively objective standards, which products must meet to gain the
right to use the label.4 25
This "single-criterion" approach of these labelling programs
has been criticized as overly simplistic. 4 2 6 The German pro-
gram, for example, generally attempts to select the single most
important environmental criterion that will allow comparison
with other products. 42 7 As a result, products with an equivalent
or even superior environmental performance may be excluded
from the scheme, effectively penalizing their manufacturers and
misleading consumers. 428
421. The plans in Canada, Germany, and the EC call for three year criteria
renewal periods. OECD, supra note 415, at 48, 52; 1992 O.J. (L 99), supra note
417, at 1, 3. Germany, for instance, raised the requirements for "recycled pa-
per" products from 50% scrap paper content to 100% in 1988 as a result of in-
dustry-wide changes in recycled paper production. OECD, supra note 415, at
48. Some have argued that the criteria in the German program have not been
updated at sufficiently regular intervals to keep up with technological develop-
ments. As a result, some paints labeled "environment-friendly" contain organic
solvents that may impose a burden on the environment when the brush is
rinsed in water (as the label instructs). ENvrRoNMENTAL DATA SERVICES, LTD.,
supra note 416, at 23. The EC standards will be made progressively tougher
every three years. Matt Haddon, Making Green Labels Stick, NEw ScIENTiST,
June 20, 1992, at 23.
422. OECD, supra note 415, at 32. Some programs have had difficulty locat-
ing qualified consumer and environmental representatives. Id. at 50.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 19; see also Environmental Protection: Eco-Babble, supra note
419, at 84 (noting that the Proctor & Gamble cradle-to-grave analysis on dispos-
able diapers was more than 100 pages long).
425. Id.
426. See Denis Hayes, Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Earth, Is-
SUES Sci. & TECH., Winter 1990-91, at 46, 47; ENVIRoNMENTAL DATA SERVICES,
LTD. supra, note 416, at 18.
427. In the German program, for example, certain gas-powered mopeds and
lawnmowers get the seal based solely on their noise levels. Hayes, supra note
426, at 46, 47.
428. See id. At the inception of the German Blue Angel program in 1978,
products were to be eligible for the symbol if they were "exceptionally beneficial
for the environment: 1) in comparison with other products serving the same
purpose, 2) with no impairment of their primary function or safety, and 3)
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Furthermore, the labelling commission must determine how
high to set the criteria for obtaining a label. As a practical mat-
ter, the determination of the criteria entails deciding how many
products will receive a label. The labelling programs all state a
goal of establishing high threshold criteria to insure a "signifi-
cant environmental benefit."429 Consequently, the labelling
body often examines the market share of a product within the
product category to determine whether enough consumers use
the product to generate a sufficient impact on the environment.
For example, the Canadian program requires that a product
have the potential to gain a major benefit from the label and
thus sets a ten to twenty percent market share threshold as a
guide for selecting products eligible for a label.430
An alternative approach emphasizes consumer information
rather than competitive incentives to improve the environment.
Japan uses a label simply to identify environmentally friendlier
products, regardless of market share.431 The Japanese ap-
proach is concerned with giving a competitive advantage to la-
beled products, which will thus increase the market share of
that product and force competing products to improve the envi-
ronmental aspects of their product.43 2 This approach would
reach more products and, in theory, affect more consumer
purchases.
following thorough investigations into all aspects of environmental protection,
including manufacturing methods." ENVmoNmrNTAL DATA SERVICES, LTD.,
supra note 416, at 11.
429. OECD, supra note 415, at 21. Labels need to be awarded sparingly to
raise product standards, but if too few products qualify, consumers may not be
sufficiently educated. Environmental Protection: Eco-Babble, supra note 419,
at 89.
430. OECD, supra note 415, at 21. The Canadian scheme is modeled closely
in some respects on the German plan. ENvmoNvmNTAL DATA SERVICES, LTD.,
supra note 416, at 30. Some products in the German scheme do not have a
major environmental impact. For instance, Zinc-air batteries are used in small
products such as hearing aids, and account for only a tiny proportion of the
battery market. Their replacement of mercury oxide batteries cannot be said to
have a major impact. Id. at 25-26.
431. OECD, supra note 415, at 52,53. The Japanese program has been crit-
icized as superficial, having granted labels in categories with trivial environ-
mental consequences such as sponges and beverage cans with stay-on tabs.
Hayes, supra note 426, at 48. The Japanese Eco-mark is usually awarded on
the basis of a single environmental attribute, making possible evaluation of 850
products in one year. Id. While the criteria are less rigorous than those in
Europe, the Eco-mark has become "popular with Japanese consumers, who
have not traditionally been associated with environmental awareness." OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 69, at 74.
432. OECD, supra note 415, at 20-21.
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An important difference among various labelling programs
concerns the input from, and role of, private citizens and enti-
ties. In foreign labelling programs, the government generally
assumes an active role. The scope and type of government in-
volvement, however, varies among programs. In the Japanese
program, for example, the government provides all technical, re-
search, and administrative support.433 In the German and Ca-
nadian programs, the government personnel and certification
authorities share responsibilities. 434 In Sweden, Finland, and
France, standardization institutes oversee the process from de-
veloping product categories and criteria to executing contracts
with manufacturers who seek to use the label.435
The decision-making authority in national environmental
labelling programs may be divided into two groups: programs in
which an independent jury has final authority and programs in
which the government has final authority.43 6 Only the German
labelling program gives the environmental label jury, with
broad representation from interested parties, the absolute au-
thority to determine product categories and criteria.437 The
Austrian and Canadian programs require that the environmen-
tal label jury submit recommendations on product categories
and criteria to the Minister of Environment for final approval.438
The two Japanese committees that determine product categories
and criteria are quasi-government agencies affiliated with the
Environment Agency.43 9 Although the particular composition of
the environmental label jury differs from country to country, all
include industry, environmental, and consumer representatives,
and often other relevant manufacturing and public interest
groups. Broad-based membership will tend to decrease the risk
and appearance of domination by any one particular group.440
433. Id. at 31.
434. Id. at 57.
435. Id. The Australian government launched its labelling program "Envi-
ronmental Choice Australia" in October 1991, based largely on European label-
ling schemes. Neil Shoebridge, Shoebridge, Bus. REV. WKLY., May 8, 1992, at
69. Standards Australia does not support the basis of the Environmental
Choice program and will recommend an alternative based on "objective crite-
ria." Id.
436. OECD, supra note 415, at 31-32.
437. Id. at 31.
438. Id. The Canadian program has a provision for public comments on pro-
posed product categories and environmental criteria. ENVIRONmENTAL DATA
SERVICES, LTD., supra note 416, at 31.
439. OECD, supra note 415, at 53, 54.
440. Id. at 32.
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The European Community established a Community Eco-
label award scheme designed to "complement other existing or
future community labelling systems."4 1 The program follows a
cradle-to-grave approach and divides responsibility among the
member nations to offer product criteria for particular prod-
ucts. 44 2 The EC program intends to reduce the environmental
impact of products during their life cycle and to provide consum-
ers with better information about the environmental impact of
products.443
Going beyond voluntary labelling programs, some govern-
ments have imposed affirmative duties on companies to reduce
waste. Japan, for instance, implemented a recycling law that
mandates recovery rates of nearly sixty percent for most dis-
carded materials (i.e., glass, paper, aluminum cans, steel cans,
and batteries) by the mid-1990s.444 Germany's Waste Disposal
Law ("Waste Law"), the strictest plan in the EC, places responsi-
bility for disposal on trade and industry.4 5 The Waste Law re-
quires companies to take back and recycle used packaging.
Although the Waste Law does not require consumers to return
packaging, producers must accept it if they do.4 4 6
441. 1992 O.J. (L 99), supra note 417, at 1. In light of the EC Eco-label, six
EC countries with no plans for a national environmental label are cooperating
with the plans for the community-wide label. OECD, supra note 415, at 68-69.
442. 1992 O.J. (L 99), supra note 417, at 2, 4. Some of the countries respon-
sible for initial product groups are: Denmark, domestic paper products; Spain,
batteries; France, paints and varnishes and insulation materials; Germany,
laundry detergents; and the United Kingdom, washing machines. OECD,
supra note 415, at 71-73. Like other schemes, various interest groups, includ-
ing industry, commerce, and consumer and environmental organizations, will
be represented. 1992 O.J. (L 99), supra note 417, at 3. The criteria established
by the former members will be evaluated approximately every three years. Id.
Each Community member will have a "competent body" that decides whether to
award the label to a particular product. Id. at 4. The competent bodies of other
member nations have 30 days to object to the award, which may then force a
vote by the Commission (composed of representatives of EC states). Id.
443. 1992 O.J. (L 99), supra note 417, at 2. Over two years after adoption of
the Eco-label, only five products could lay claim to the label, and the Commis-
sion and Member States have only managed to reach agreement on the criteria
for award of the label for two products-washing machines and dishwashers.
Green Labelling: European Eco-Label About to be Flushed Away?, supra note
18 (no pagination).
444. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 69, at 73.
445. Clemens Weidemann, Germany: Regulation on the Avoidance of Pack-
aging Waste, 31 INTL LEGAL MATERiALS 1135 (1992).
446. Id. at 1136. The Waste Law; in particular, has raised several problems.
An 80% recycling rate mandated by 1995 exceeds any level currently achieved
and probably sets an unachievable goal. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESS-
MEN r, supra note 69, at 71. Moreover, the Waste Law unduly focuses on re-
cycling, yet without enlisting the help of consumers, and ignores the goals of
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V. MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: HAVE WE FIGURED
THIS OUT YET?
EOI reveals that the government should intervene in the
market only when evidence of systematic market failure exists.
Both the FTC447 and the United States Supreme Court448 recog-
nize the benefits of informational advertising and thus recognize
that information is an economic good. Persistent deceptive ad-
vertising, however, if left unchecked, may result in a misalloca-
tion of resources and eventually undermine the system.44 9
Market failure alone does not necessarily justify government in-
tervention.450 The appropriate question is whether government
intervention will result in a more efficient allocation of
resources.
45
'
In the market for environmental information, some con-
sumer uncertainty persists. Consumer uncertainty alone, how-
ever, does not justify additional regulation. The market appears
to function extremely well with intervention limited to regula-
tion of deceptive advertising. Anti-deceptive advertising regula-
tions can make the market for environmental information more
efficient.452 The FTC has favored a market-oriented approach to
source reduction. Id. Finally, the Waste Law raises potential problems with
respect to international trade because it applies to all products sold in Ger-
many. Id.
447. Beales, supra note 356, at 101, 102.
448. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) ("As to the particular consumer's interest in
the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.").
449. Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regula-
tion of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. Ruv. 661, 667-69 (1977); Schecter, supra note
291, at 580.
450. Beales et al., supra note 136, at 502-03.
451. Id. at 501. Allocation of resources may be more "efficient" in several
ways. First, allocation may be efficient in the sense that consumers are able to
purchase products with those attributes that they desire. Second, resource use
may be efficient in the sense that informational resources are supplied at lower
cost. As this Article reveals, neither of these benefits is likely to occur with
additional government intervention into the environmental advertising market.
452. Although commentators differ on the level of market intervention,
there appears to be agreement that some enforcement activity is appropriate.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 134, at 31 (appraising FTC enforcement in light of
economic criteria); Robert Pitofsky, Advertising Regulation and the Consumer
Movement, in ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION, supra
note 128, at 27.
The disputes among the commentators appear to be focused around two
issues: 1) the elimination of the "fool's test" for deception, see supra notes 291-
315 and accompanying text, and 2) competitor's rights to sue pursuant to
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See supra notes 368-380 and accompanying text.
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regulating advertising as reflected by its adoption of the "reason-
able consumer" standard in its Deception Policy.45 3
Unfortunately, states have not followed the FTC's con-
straint. State enforcement agencies have more aggressively en-
forced allegedly "unfair" or "deceptive" advertising.454 The
states' enforcement activities contradict the principles discussed
earlier in this Article and have little to do with consumer wel-
fare considerations. Professors Beales and Muris highlight the
ulterior motives of state officials who initiate enforcement ac-
tions. Foremost, a state official will benefit from publicity.45 5
Ironically, citizens of other states bear the bulk of these enforce-
ment costs.4 56 The extraterritorial effect of an individual state's
enforcement action means that only a small portion of the af-
fected population participates in the political process that influ-
ences the level and type of enforcement activity.4 57 Beales and
Muris suggest that, as a result, states resort to simple theories,
such as the pre-Deception Policy definition of deception, and
See also Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should
be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 31 UCLA L. Rnv. 671, 672
(1984) (endorsing extension of Lanham Act to protect consumers, competitors,
and the competitive process); Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A
Comparative Study of Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private
Litigation, 20 GA. L. REv. 1, 70-71 (1985) (concluding private litigation is the
best for controlling some kinds of false advertising); Lillian R. BeVier, Competi-
tor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle
in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 40-42 (1992) (arguing that competitor
lawsuits are ineffective to protect consumer interest); Lee Goldman, The
World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 FLA. L. REv.
488 (1993) (endorsing competitor suits); Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An
Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 528
(1979) (arguing that competitors do not need false advertising remedy); Petty,
supra note 359 (questioning Lanham Act's ability to protect consumers); Pitof-
sky, supra note 449, at 667-69 (stating that under the Lanham Act competitors
will often suffer injury sufficient to justify bringing suit; consumers usually will
not); Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle: Some Reac-
tions to Professor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REV. 57 (1992) (critiquing Professor BeVier's
position); Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Note, The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Stan-
dards Governing the Regulation of False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 339, 340-41 (1991) (doubting usefulness of competi-
tor suits for false advertising).
453. See supra notes 289-315 (discussing evolution of the FTC's deception
standards).
454. See supra notes 335-354 and accompanying text (discussing state
regulation).
455. BEALs & Munis, supra note 10, at 134-46; Beales, supra note 356, at
101.
456. BEALs & Mums, supra note 10, at 118.
457. Id.
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avoid technical evidence, such as consumer surveys, to more eas-
ily prevail in enforcement actions. 45s
Because state enforcement will not enhance consumer wel-
fare, enforcement should rest exclusively with the FTC. A pre-
emptive federal scheme remains unlikely.459  The FTC
Guidelines have thus far limited much state enforcement.
Although the FTC could have provided "guidance" through case-
by-case enforcement, adopting the FTC Guidelines indicated the
FTC's seriousness and reduced the perceived benefit from addi-
tional state action. Indeed, the FTC Guidelines may deter any
additional statutory and regulatory activity by the states.460
Some commentators argue that the FTC Guidelines do not
sufficiently address the environmental problem and point to the
need for mandatory, uniform definitions.461 Uniform defini-
tions, however, inappropriately mix environmental policy and
advertising policy.4 62 Although a lack of standardization is a
market imperfection often apparent in information markets, 463
imposing uniform definitions when no consensus exists concern-
ing the underlying policy is foolhardy, at best. At worst, it be-
comes deceptive and unduly paternalistic. 464
In addition, increased government intervention necessarily
imposes serious costs. Most importantly, increased regulation
risks chilling beneficial informational advertising.465 "Single
definition" statutes limit beneficial speech; a manufacturer may
not advertise its product as "recycled," for example, unless it
458. Id. at 147-50.
459. All of the federal proposals specifically preserve state enforcement. See
supra notes 392-398 and accompanying text (discussing proposed federal
legislation).
460. BEALES & Mums, supra note 10, at 111-12.
461. See supra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 115-132 and accompanying text (discussing problems
with advertising regulations).
463. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competi-
tion, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, passim (1985) (discussing in-
formation standardization).
464. See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text (discussing paternalis-
tic aspects of environmental advertising regulations).
465. See, e.g., Epilogue to MEMBER OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION To-
GETHER WITH COMMENTS FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, FTC RE-
VIEW (1977-84): A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
98th Cong. 2d Sess. 242 (1984) ("Overregulation of advertising can chill aggres-
sive competition and impose fruitless burdens on a shaky economy."); Pitofsky,
supra note 449, at 701 ("[T]he major recent programs [to regulate advertising]
are based on a revised and more sensible view of the function of advertising in
the market and should result in higher levels of consumer welfare.").
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meets the statutory definition. Yet, there is nothing magical in
the definitions. In formulating advertising policy, those decid-
ing that a "recycled" product must contain twenty-five percent
recycled materials do not base their decision on scientific cer-
tainty or on an examination of manufacturing processes; rather,
the policy maker subjectively decides that twenty-five percent is
a good target. A manufacturer whose product contains ten per-
cent recycled materials thus can not advertise that attribute
even though the use of ten percent recycled materials may pro-
vide a significant environmental benefit when compared to
competitors.
A final possibility is to create a government-sponsored seal
of approval. The experience in Japan, Germany, the EC, and
other countries demonstrates that labelling programs suffer
from numerous pitfalls. Primarily, as with establishing uniform
definitions, the environmental policy decisions must be made
prior to defining the conditions necessary for granting a seal.
Moreover, as with the problems of PLCAs, 466 the standards to
receive a logo involve making tradeoffs between environmental
impacts that only can be made based on value judgments.46 7
Secondarily, the large bureaucratic costs of an environmental la-
belling program will likely exceed the social benefits.468 The
market can develop alternatives to a government seal and more
efficiently disseminate information concerning the environmen-
tal attributes of products.
CONCLUSION
Because the market appears to function efficiently, those
who favor additional regulation bear the burden of proving that
government intervention will leave consumers in a better posi-
tion.469 Commentators favoring such intervention have not met
this burden. Consumers have become better informed about the
environmental attributes of products without government regu-
lation and have a large amount of information available to eval-
uate environmental choices. Environmental advertising is an
important piece of that information puzzle. Any remaining con-
sumer uncertainty corresponds with the recognition that infor-
466. See supra notes 50-105 and accompanying text (discussing PLCAs).
467. Id.
468. See OECD, supra note 415, at 24-28 (discussing program financing).
469. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985)
("[T]he free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify impos-
ing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the
false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.").
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mation is a costly good. Commentators argue that consumer
purchasing patterns are not consistent with their own, usually
undisclosed, visions of environmental policy. These commenta-
tors seemingly would craft environmental advertising policy to
subversively accomplish their undisclosed policy goals. This ap-
proach would require limiting environmental information to
that which is consistent with the environmental policy ad-
vanced. Deceiving consumers under the guise of advertising pol-
icy is completely inconsistent with the underpinnings of
consumer protection and should be avoided.
